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EFFICIENCY AND IMAGE: ADVERTISING AS
AN ANTITRUST ISSUE
ELIZABETH MENSCH* AND ALAN FREEMAN**
Advertising ministers to the spiritual side of trade. It is great power
that has been entrusted to your keeping which charges you with the
high responsibility of inspiring and ennobling the commercial world.




These are stirring times. In the past year we have witnessed the end
of the Cold War, followed by the quick, largely peaceful demolition of
the political structures that had dominated Eastern Europe for more
than forty years. Incontestably, these revolutions were about politics,
given the oppressive character of the toppled regimes. Yet they were also
about economics-a quest for a competitive free market economy to re-
place the stagnation of centralized planning by state bureaucracies estab-
lished in the name of Marxist theory.
As we write these words in our kitchen, we cannot help but notice
that the nearby cereal cupboard contains such items as a large box la-
beled, in big, friendly, blue letters, "Super Golden Crisp." The lower
half of the bright, golden box depicts a jolly brown bear in a blue t-shirt,
dispensing honey from a large honey jar onto wheat puffs in an oversized
bowl: This bear is a frequent protagonist in Golden Crisp T.V. commer-
cials, lively mini-adventures in which the bear appears as an unfailing,
cheery superhero. On the cereal box, next to the huge bowl, appears a
printed message: "Solve the Triple Trouble Mystery-Free Action-
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I. From a speech to the 1926 convention of the American Association of Advertising Agen-
cies, quoted in D. POPE, THE MAKING OF MODERN ADVERTISING 112 (1983).
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Packed Flip Book Inside." That announcement attracted our four-year
old's attention in the store. Placating his demands, we bought the cereal,
and are now obliged to search every morning for the Action-Packed Flip
Book.
Also in the cereal cabinet is a straightforward box labeled "Weg-
man's [a local supermarket chain] Vitamin Fortified Raisin Bran Ce-
real." More than half the box front is devoted to a photograph of a large
bowl of raisin bran, accompanied by a spoon. That picture is not unap-
pealing, yet it concededly lacks the brightness of the grinning honeycomb
bear. On a long supermarket shelf, no four-year old would choose this
box, but of course the price of Wegman's Raisin Bran is lower than that
of Kellogg's, for example, with its familiar, smiling sun face.
It may be difficult to imagine that our society would suffer grievous
injury if we were deprived of jolly honey bears and instead limited to
simply-packaged and unadvertised goods at lower prices, so long as one
could count on both quality and availability. Yet, quality and availabil-
ity were precisely what the failed economies of Eastern Europe could not
provide: With their prices pegged to reflect authentic Marxist "use val-
ues" instead of the dreaded capitalist "exchange values,"' 2 and their out-
put decisions based on bureaucratic fiat rather than consumer preference,
their consumer goods fell woefully short. Thus we wonder: Does the
adoption of a market economy, as an antidote to the dismal failure of its
absence, lead inevitably to the visual cacophony of the cereal aisle of the
American supermarket, with the cloying and competing imagery of
"Captain Crunch," "Froot Loops," "Count Chocula," and the like?
The meaning of all this advertising for our economy, and for compe-
tition in particular, provides the subject of this Article. Part I offers a
doctrinal history of advertising as an antitrust issue over the past twenty-
five years. 3 For more than fifteen of those years it was intellectually re-
spectable and legally persuasive to characterize advertising as an instru-
ment for the realization of anti-competitive goals. In some cases ads
were described with outright scorn and derision. The early 1980s, how-
ever, represented a dramatic epistemological break in the legal treatment
of advertising. Now, not only are once respectable arguments thor-
oughly repudiated, but advertising has secured a preferred and even priv-
ileged status in contemporary antitrust doctrine.
Part II describes the intellectual context in which that epistemologi-
cal break occurred.4 Although attributable in part to appointments by
2. For some classic accounts of this distinction, see E. MANDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MARxigT ECONOMIC THEORY 9-11 (1970); MARX ON ECONOMICS 29-33 (R. Freedman ed. 1961).
3. See infra notes 6-86 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 87-136 and accompanying text.
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President Reagan to the federal judiciary and to the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC), the break occurred within the context of an active debate
among economists about the economic meaning of product differentia-
tion achieved through advertising and the relation of that phenomenon
to the economic model of perfect competition. Whereas economists
sought to contain that debate within the disciplinary boundaries of eco-
nomic theory, liberals and conservatives alike were compelled to make
assumptions about, advertising that were inevitably external to the disci-
pline of economics itself. Thus, although the conservatives seem to have
carried the day on this issue in the political and legal arenas, their as-
sumptions remain no more plausible than the liberal ones they success-
fully displaced.
In order to underscore the difficulty of analyzing advertising by ref-
erence to any single definitional category, Part III examines advertising
in its social and historical context.5 We suggest that advertising is a com-
plex historical phenomenon, one which has both created and been cre-
ated by American culture as a whole. As such, it cannot be made to fit
the neat labeling of either "pro-" or "anti-" competitive. We conclude,
therefore, by suggesting that advertising requires a legal analysis that is
sensitively contextual in approach, avoiding the pitfalls of both liberal
and conservative formalism.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF ADVERTISING AS AN ANTITRUST ISSUE
The story begins in the heady days of the 1960s, when antitrust en-
forcement reached its 20th-century peak, especially with respect to merg-
ers and concentration. Taking its cue from the Celler-Kefauver
Amendments of 1950,6 the Supreme Court applied a rigid per se illegality
approach to vertical or horizontal agreements exhibiting any tendency
toward concentration. This period in antitrust doctrine was character-
ized by what may be termed "liberal formalism": Business practices
were judged according to their membership in rigidly predefined concep-
tual/legal categories. Some judgments of illegality that emerged during
this formalist period were notoriously indifferent to market context or
real competitive consequence. 7
5. See infra notes 137-205 and accompanying text.
6. Chapter 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)) (amending
Clayton Act, ch. 322, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)).
7. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (setting a maximum price for newspa-
pers constituted per se violation of § I of the Sherman Act), reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 1018 (1968);
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (system of "exclusive" territorial licenses
where no member could sell Topco brand products outside the territory minimized competition at
that retail level and was horizontal restraint constituting per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act);
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (merger of two of the largest and most
Vol. 1990:3211
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The most militant antitrust enforcers yearned, however, for a doc-
trine based not on formalist legal categories, but simply and neatly on
concentration itself, on the assumption that "big is bad." During this
liberal period Congress considered legislation designed to attack concen-
tration directly,8 but absent its enactment, both courts and the FTC were
generally unwilling to adopt a straight structural analysis of oligopoly
power. Instead, without a real framework for analyzing the evils of con-
centration, they tried to name the supposed anti-competitive effects of
concentration by reference to traditional antitrust categories. Thus, for
example, courts manipulated the market phenomenon of conscious paral-
lelism to a form that would satisfy the agreement or conspiracy require-
ment of section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 Similarly, the Supreme Court
justified condemning vertical mergers by adopting the highly problematic
theory of "market foreclosure," thereby finding sufficient "anti-competi-
tive effect" to meet the doctrinal requirement.10
Meanwhile, already on the horizon in the early 1960s was the grow-
ing phenomenon of conglomerate merger, which fit neatly into neither
the horizontal nor the vertical merger category. Ironically, that phenom-
enon, which reached its peak in the late 1960s, probably was due in part
to strict enforcement of the Celler-Kefauver Amendments: After Celler-
Kefauver, combinations of previously unrelated businesses were the only
profitable grocery stores in market area which showed steady decline in the number of smaller shops,
combined with absorption of smaller stores into larger stores, violated § 7 of the Clayton Act);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (merger of shoe manufacturer and retailer
would substantially reduce competition in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act).
8. See, eg., Industrial Reorganization Act (The Hart Bill, S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973)); The Concentrated Industries Act (Neal Report) (1968), reprinted in INDUSTRIAL CONCEN-
TRATION: ThE NE W LEARNING 444, 448 (H. Goldschmidt, H. Mann, & J. Weston eds. 1974)
[hereinafter INDusTRIAL CONCENTRATION].
9. See, eg., Ambook Enters. v. Time Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 614-18 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant
denied summary judgment on antitrust charge where there was proof of consciously parallel business
behavior between the media and advertisers), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980); Bogosian v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 440, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1977) (complaint alleging defendants engaged in con-
sciously parallel action which enabled them to compel lessee dealers to buy only the defendants
gasoline was sufficient to allege an illegal combination), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). For the
1960s spirit that infused these cases, see generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act" Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). Compare
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-65 (1984) (current conspiracy standard
requires evidence of agreement to engage in concerted conduct to fix prices, that the distributor
communicated its acquiescence or agreement and such agreement was sought by the manufacturer),
reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984).
10. E.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (du Pont-General
Motors) (market foreclosure found where General Motors accounted for 40% of annual total sales of
automobiles, its requirements for automotive finishes were similarly 40% of the total market, and du
Pont supplied 67% of General Motors finishes); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328-34 (trend toward
vertical integration in market supports possibility of future market foreclosure, despite aberrant
competitive conditions; injunction against merger affirmed).
[Vol. 1990:321
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combinations still considered presumptively immune from legal attack."
Given doctrinal restraints, enforcers who were wary of ever-growing ag-
gregates of assets assembled under single-firm hierarchical control
needed to label the precise anti-competitive effects stemming from con-
glomerate mergers.
An opportunity for such labeling came in response to Procter &
Gamble's acquisition of Clorox Chemical Company in August, 1957.
Procter was the nation's single largest advertiser, having spent upwards
of $80 million on advertising in 1957 alone. Its total domestic sales for
the same year amounted to $900 million. Of that amount, $414 million
represented sales of "packaged detergents," in which market Procter ac-
counted for 54.5% of the national total. Clorox, meanwhile, was the
leading manufacturer of household liquid bleach, with its 1957 sales of
$40 million accounting for almost 50% of the national total for that
product. Its two closest competitors accounted for only 15.7% and
5.9%, respectively. 12
Both the sheer size of Procter & Gamble and the disproportionate
dominance of Clorox in its own market might offer considerable cause
for apprehension. Yet, absent a framework for analyzing both concentra-
tion and conglomerate size as such, they did not necessarily constitute an
antitrust violation, either alone or in combination. Nevertheless, in a
clever and sophisticated (albeit facile) opinion, Commissioner Elman of
the FTC concluded that Procter's acquisition of Clorox would tend "sub-
stantially to lessen competition"' 3 in the market for household liquid
bleach in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Elman carefully de-
scribed the merger as not just conglomerate but "of the product exten-
sion variety,"' 4 (i.e., horizontal), playing on the conceded reality that
bleach appears alongside detergent on supermarket shelves and that both
are used together in washing clothes. Further underscoring the merger's
11. See J. BROoKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME 173 (1987). According to Brooks, this period still
represents the greatest conglomerate wave in American history, reaching a peak in 1967-69. In 1969
there were 6,000 acquisitions, and over the decade almost 25,000 firms disappeared through merger.
The typical goal, however, was not concentration, but stock promotion in an historic bull market.
Id.
12. These facts are set forth in the Report of more than 120 pages in The Procter & Gamble
Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465 (1963), which includes, in the manner of F.T.C. Reports, the complaint, initial
decision, and the opinion of the Commission.
13. Id at 1560.
14. Id. at 1543. As Elman pointed out, all mergers were technically within the reach of
amended section 7, and in theory the legal test for any merger was the same--"whether its effect
may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." Id. at 1547. Neverthe-
less, there was an established basis for dealing with horizontal and vertical mergers as anti-competi-
tive that was lacking in the case of conglomerate mergers. Mergers that could be likened to
horizontal or vertical would seem more appropriately described as anti-competitive.
Vol. 1990:321]
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supposed horizontal character, Elman also stressed the possibility that as
an alternative to acquiring Clorox, Procter might instead have entered
the liquid bleach market in competition with Clorox. 15 Therefore, the
merger resulted in loss of potential competition.
In addition to this exercise in categorization, Elman also drew on
the fact that the key to the successful marketing of products in the gen-
eral cleanser line-soaps, bleaches, detergents--lies in advertising. Both
Clorox and Procter (given the latter's well-established brands like Ivory,
Comet, Crest, and Charmin) relied on the advantages of strong mass ad-
vertising and sales promotion. Ehnan implicitly adopted the theory that
such advertising constitutes a barrier to new entry. He pointed to the
obstacles to new competition that he assumed would tend to prevail in
"industries strongly marked by mass advertising and sales promo-
tions." 16 He specified the brand loyalty achieved through Clorox's past
advertising, its ability as a nationally marketed product to respond
quickly to any new competitive foray, the volume discounts available to
large advertisers like Procter, along with the opportunity to sponsor
whole television programs, as well as its advantages in mail, sales, and
store display promotions.17 Indeed, he asserted, the principal gain to be
realized by Procter through the acquisition would be the efficient deploy-
ment of advertising on behalf of its new product. Elman's opinion indi-
cated that those economies could be considered anti-competitive for
purposes of antitrust law:
inhere du,.-s come a point "at which product differentiation ceases to
promote weifare and becomes wasteful, or mass advertising loses its
informative aspect and merely entrenches market leaders." We think
that point has been reached in the liquid bleach industry. In short, the
kind of "efficiency" and "economy" produced by this merger is pre-
cisely the kind that... hurts, not helps, a competitive economy and
burdens, not benefits, the consuming public.... Advertising ...
should stimulate competition and, by increasing sales of the advertised
product, lower the unit cost of that product. But this process is dis-
torted in the case of a homogeneous product, such as household liquid
bleach, produced under conditions of oligopoly, such as obtain in the
liquid bleach industry. Since there is no reason (save cheapness and
availability) for a consumer to prefer one brand of liquid bleach over
another, there is no real need for the various manufacturers to incur as
heavy advertising expenses as they do-except to protect their market
shares. Moreover, since oligopolists typically refrain from price com-
petition, large advertising expenditures in the liquid bleach industry
have not resulted in a lower unit price.... Thus we have a situation in
15. Id. at 1577-78.
16. Id. at 1568.
17. Id. at 1562-69.
326 [Vol. 1990,321
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which heavy advertising benefits the consumer, who pays for such ad-
vertising in the form of a higher price for the product, not at all. 18
The Elman opinion in Clorox was followed in 1965 by the highly
influential article, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 19 by Donald Turner, who was head of the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice from 1965 through 1968. Turner offered an analy-
sis of advertising and promotional "economies" that closely fit, but did
not stray beyond, the context of the Clorox case. After extensive discus-
sion Turner concluded that the advantages in promotional economies
secured through merger should not, by themselves, be treated as suffi-
cient basis for invalidating a merger, absent other demonstrable, anti-
competitive effects. 20 Thus, Turner rejected the most extreme anti-adver-
tising interpretation of Clorox Yet, later in the article, citing Clorox with
specific approval, Turner argued that once some anti-competitive effect
had been demonstrated (such as the loss of a potential competitor, as
found in Clorox), then promotional economies could not be invoked to
defend the merger, so long as those economies were "'clearly' promo-
tional, wholly or in all but a small part," as opposed to "true" distribu-
tional economies.21 For Turner, that classification of the advertising
economies in Clorox was easy, given the fact that had been emphasized
by Elman: "[All] household liquid bleaches are chemically identical."'22
Implicit in Turner's analysis was the assumption that successful
product differentiation through advertising, at least in the case of identi-
cal products, must be "false." Yet Turner's cautious, balanced treatment
of advertising was ultimately paradoxical: If, in fact, advertising econo-
mies are "offensive to at least the spirit, if not the letter, of antitrust laws,'
'wasteful,'" and the sort of "efficiency" that "merely entrenches market
leaders" 23 (to use Elman's words), should not a merger that maximizes a
firm's power to deploy advertising be considered anti-competitive for an-
titrust purposes?
Neither Turner, at least in 1965, nor Elman seemed ready to go that
far. Nevertheless, in March, 1966, the FTC ordered General Foods Cor-
poration to divest itself of the S.O.S. Company, which it had acquired in
1957, and the issue of advertising was central to the FTC's decision. By
1957 General Foods had yearly advertising and promotion expenses of
$69 million. By 1961 it was the nation's third largest advertiser, with
18. Id. at 1581-82.
19. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. Rrv. 1313
(1965).
20. Id. at 1391.
21. Id. at 1361. Turner's approach was cautious, and he called his position "far from clear."
22. Id. at 1361 n.67.
23. The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1581 (1963).
Vol. 1990:321]
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most of that advertising going to national TV. Prior to the acquisition,
there had been two dominant firms manufacturing steel wool pads for
household use-S.O.S. with 51% of the market ($14.6 million in sales)
and Brillo with 47.6% ($13.6 million in sales). Under the control of
General Foods, the amount S.O.S. spent for television advertising rose
from $1.39 million to a high of $2.52 million per year-an 80% increase.
In the immediate post-acquisition years S.O.S. lost ground to Brillo, but
starting in 1960, S.O.S.'s market share rose steadily as a result of General
Food's expensive advertising campaign. In particular, S.O.S. made sub-
stantial inroads into the New York City metropolitan market, where
Brillo previously had dominated with a 77% share. By 1962 S.O.S. had
increased its market share in that area to 56%. Brillo tried to fight back
with its own advertising and promotion campaign, but could not afford
to compete with General Foods, and in 1963 Brillo merged with Purex.
24
In the majority opinion ordering the divestiture of S.O.S., the FTC
defined the anti-competitive effect of the merger to be the entry barriers
created by mass advertising:
In this case, as in Clorox the barriers to entry were high prior to ac-
quisition. In each case, the product of the acquired company was
functionally identical to that produced by smaller companies but was
differentiated through extensive advertising and a long history of domi-
nance in the field .... The entry of General Foods into the household
steel wool market substantially heightened the factual and psychologi-
cal barriers to entry to that market just as the entry of Procter in the
liquid bleach market raised the barriers surrounding that market.25
In S.O.S. there was no evidence to support even an inference that
General Foods was a "potential competitor" in the steel wool market, as
Procter had been in Clorox. Thus, the sole basis for finding a violation
had to be the fact that General Foods was able to use its resources to
advertise S.O.S. more effectively than could S.O.S. alone. According to
the FTC, integration of S.O.S. into General Foods' intensive overall pro-
motion and marketing scheme meant that the merger was of a "product
extension" variety26 (hence horizontal); and the success of the resultant
integrated advertising constituted the anti-competitive effects necessary
to justify the order for divestiture.27
24. The facts are detailed in the Report. General Foods Corp., 69 F.T.C. 380, 385, 429-49
(1966).
25. Id at 423.
26. Id at 422.
27. For example, General Foods broke Brillo's virtual monopoly in the New York City area
with an advertising campaign featuring Molly Goldberg, a well-known actress, appealing to the
Jewish population of the city. Id. at 401 (initial decision).
[Vol. 1990:321
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Despite his anti-advertising rhetorical flourishes in Clorox, Elman
dissented from the FTC's opinion in S.O.S., relying heavily upon the
cautionary message of Turner's article and stressing the fact that General
Foods would not have entered the steel wool market except through ac-
quisition of S.O.S.28 Consequently, despite implications to the contrary
in Clorox, Elman was unwilling to punish a conglomerate merger solely
because it achieved advertising economies of scale.
Turner, however, apparently took inspiration from the FTC's will-
ingness to go beyond the confines of Clorox. In a much-cited speech of
June, 1966, Turner suggested that advertising itself appropriately might
be considered an antitrust culprit, responsible for perpetuating or in-
creasing industrial concentration:
To an extent, the increased barrier to entry created by advertising is a
price we have to pay for providing consumers with information. But
when heavy advertising and other promotional expenditures create du-
rable preferences going beyond the relative superiority of the product,
resistant to anything but major countervailing promotional campaigns,
we may well question whether the price has not become too high. If
heavy advertising expenditures thus serve to raise the barriers to entry,
adverse competitive consequences are important not only because new
firms are kept out, but also because frequently it is the prospect of new
entry which serves as a major competitive restraint upon the actions of
existing firms. Moreover, where the numbers of firms in an industry
are few, this potentiality may be the most significant competitive fac-
tor that inhibits firms from setting high prices and achieving extensive
monopoly rewards. 29
By implication, Turner's speech suggested attacking entire oligopolistic
industries on the basis of successful promotional practices alone. First,
however, one needed to know whether the FTC had stayed within appro-
priate legal boundaries in Clorox and S.O.S. The Supreme Court gave an
initial affimative response in 1967 when it reversed a Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision and reinstated the FTC's order in Clorox. 30 Justice
Douglas, joined by five others on the Court, relied on the fact that
Procter "with its huge assets and advertising advantages" would dissuade
new entry with the ever-present implicit threat of predatory advertising
and would "discourage active competition from firms already in the in-
dustry. ' 31 However, Douglas also relied on the Commission's finding
that the acquisition of Clorox by Procter eliminated Procter as a poten-
28. Id. at 452 (Elman, Comm'r, dissenting); see generally id. at 449-59.
29. Turner, Advertising and Competition (an address delivered in Washington, D.C., before the
Briefing Conference on Federal Controls of Advertising and Promotion) (June 2, 1966), reprinted in
M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PrroFsKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 971-74 (3d ed. 1990).
30. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
31. Id. at 575.
VCol. 1990:321]
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tial competitor. 'the opinion left unresolved whether advertising advan-
tages alone, with their assumed entry barriers, would be sufficient basis
for invalidating a conglomerate merger.
32
Justice Douglas' opinion attracted no dissenters, but in a prophetic
concurring opinion Justice Harlan reluctantly agreed with the result, yet
carefully limited his agreement to the precise facts of the case. Harlan
then took sharp exception to Elman's negative characterization of adver-
tising, including Elman's snide dismissal of the possibility that advertis-
ing efficiencies might ever be a positive reason for validating a merger.
Harlan (like Elman and Turner as well) took the view that economies in
general could be used to defend a merger-"[a] merger that results in
increased efficiency of production, distribution, or marketing may, in cer-
tain cases, increase the vigor of competition in the relevant market."1
33
For that reason Harlan vigorously disagreed with Ehnan's refusal to con-
sider advertising efficiencies as equivalent to other efficiencies:
[A]dvertising economies were placed [by the Commission, in Eliman's
opinion] in a different classification since they were said "only to in-
crease the barriers to new entry," and to be "offensive to at least the
spirit, if not the letter, of the antitrust laws." Advertising was thought
to benefit only the seller by entrenching his market position, and to be
of no use to the consumer.
I find the Commission's view overstated and oversimplified.
Proper advertising serves a legitimate and important purpose in the
market by educating the consumer as to available alternatives. This
process contributes to consumer demand being developed to the point
at which economies of scale can be realized in production. The adver-
tiser's brand name may also be an assurance of quality, and the value
of this benefit is demonstrated by the general willingness of consumers
to pay a premium for the advertised brands. Undeniably advertising
may sometimes be used to create irrational brand preferences and mis-
lead consumers as to the actual differences between products, but it is
very difficult to discover at what point advertising ceases to be an as-
pect of healthy competition.
34
As Harlan correctly perceived, Elman's decision to place advertising
and promotional activities in a distinct and negative category for anti-
trust purposes inevitably compelled antitrust law to make a normative
judgment about the social value of advertising. As Harlan explained: "It
is not the Commission's function to decide which lawful elements of the
'product' offered the consumer should be considered useful and which
should be considered the symptoms of industrial 'sickness.' It is the con-
32. Douglas had not reached this issue since his approach consistently ruled irrelevant any
claims of productive or marketing efficiency, once an anti-competitive effect had been found.
33. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 603 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 603-04 (footnote omitted).
[VCol. 1990:321
EFFICIENCY AND IMAGE
sumer who must make that election, through the exercise of his purchas-
ing power."
' 35
Despite Harlan's concern, in June 1967, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit specifically interpreted the Supreme Court's Clorox de-
cision to justify upholding the FTC's order in the S.O.S. case.36 The
Third Circuit adopted the Commission's theory that General Foods' ad-
vertising and promotional advantages would heighten both "factual and
psychological barriers to entry" and "disable and render less competi-
tive" other firms already in the industry.
37
Having made an initial foray into the realm of advertising and con-
glomerate mergers with Clorox, the Supreme Court declined to re-enter
immediately and denied certiorari inS.O.S. Advertising was left occupy-
ing a distinctly negative category for antitrust purposes, and under
S.O.S. might even be the basis for a finding of illegality. The stage was
set for determining exactly how far those implications would extend.
Shortly thereafter, on June 4, 1969, Rufus Wilson, then Chief of the
Division of General Trade Restraints at the FTC, requested authoriza-
tion to investigate the breakfast cereal industry. In a memorandum to
the Commission, 38 Wilson noted that the Office of Program Review had
been recommending for some time that the Restraint of Trade Bureau
shift its focus away from anti-competitive "conduct"-the "mail-bag," or
letters of complaint approach-toward a more "structural" analysis of
highly concentrated industries. The goal should be to examine the non-
competitive character of those industries, not their specific anti-competi-
tive practices.
39
Although Wilson endorsed this structural approach, he was careful
to point out that it represented a clear departure from existing antitrust
precedent:
So far as I know, no decision has ever been handed down declaring
that the members of any industry have a legal duty to "compete" or, to
put it another way, that consumers have a legal "right" to buy at com-
petitiveprices The law has simply not been focused on these "perform-
ance" characteristics-high prices, high costs, retarded innovation
records, etc.-but on various "conduct," or behavior patterns consid-
ered particularly offensive for one reason or another.4°
35. Id. at 604.
36. General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967).
37. Ia at 945.
38. This memo is reprinted as Wilson, The FTC's Deconcentration Case Against the Breakfast-
Cereal Industry. A New "Ballgame" in Antitrust, 4 ANTrrRusT L. & ECON. REV. 57 (1971). The
populist Antitrust Law and Economics Review heralded the memo, suggesting that the case could
"easily be the most important antitrust action in the nation's history." Id. at 58.
39. Id. at 60.
40. Id. at 63.
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In urging a structural analysis of the cereal industry, Wilson empha-
sized that the only anti-competitive "conduct" the Commission would be
able to point to would be advertising. In the cereal industry, which had a
three-firm market share of 83% (Kellogg, 43%; General Mills, 22%;
General Foods, 18%),41 the Commission was unlikely to find, for exam-
ple, predatory conduct of the kind clearly proscribed by law. Oligo-
polists, said Wilson,
don't need to engage in such crudities as these. The only kind of "con-
duct" needed to maintain their noncompetitive industry structure and
the super-competitive price and cost levels it generates (Kellogg had a
10-year average profit rate of more than 20% after taxes on stock-
holder equity) is a very large "ad" budget, one that bombards millions
of children daily with TV commercials extolling the (largely imagi-
nary, we're told) superiority of their ereals .... The moving cause of
the high concentration (and thus of the high costs and prices) is simply
the "product differentiation" created and maintained by the advertis-
ing itself.42
Thus, although Wilson described "structure/performance" as the
central orientation of any potential FTC proceeding against the cereal
industry, he emphasized that structural analysis would be supplemented
by a single conduct component, specifically, advertising:
There can no longer be any serious doubt about the capacity of certain
kinds of advertising, pursued with sufficient intensity, to bring about a
massive restructuring of an industry, to "concentrate" its sales volume
in the hands of two or three firms.... In a situation when advertising
has in fact been used to achieve this level of result, it should enjoy no
more immunity from the antitrust laws than any other kind of concen-
tration-increasing behavior. If the law will not allow three or four
firms to gather the bulk of industry's sales into their hands by means
of, say, mergers, it is far from clear as to why they should be allowed to
achieve the same result--concentration . . . -by another technique
that is equally unrelated to genuine competitive rivalry in terms of
price or quality.43
On April 26, 1972, the FTC filed the complaint Wilson had sug-
gested. The complaint charged that the big three (along with Quaker
Oats, the fourth largest producer) "have maintained and now maintain a
highly concentrated and noncompetitive market structure," 44 and that
they maintained high entry barriers by practices of "proliferating brands,
differentiating similar products, and promoting trademarks through in-
41. Id at 64.
42. Id. at 65.
43. Id at 73.
44. Complaint, Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 11 (1982).
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tensive advertising. '45 They also were charged with unfair competition
in the form of excessive and misleading claims on behalf of their cereals,
especially in ads directed toward children. According to the complaint,
those ads have "the capacity and tendency to mislead consumers, partic-
ularly children, into the mistaken belief that respondents' Ready-To-Eat
cereals are different from other RTE cereals, thereby facilitating artificial
differentiation and brand proliferations." 46 At the heart of the FTC's
structure and entry-barrier theory was the explicit assumption that to
delude consumers into believing that similar products are in fact substan-
tially different is an illegitimate form of competition. To believe in the
particularized virtues of Froot Loops, Lucky Charms, and Count
Chocula is to surrender to an inauthenticity of taste carefully engineered
by profit-seeking oligopolists.
The case offered no small challenge to basic traditions of American
consumerism. It was not likely to be decided lightly or overnight. In
fact, the case did not even come to trial until 1976, and complaint coun-
sel did not conclude its case-in-chief until January 1978. 47 The final deci-
sion by the FTC would not come until 1982.48
While the Cereal Case was pending, the FTC-not content to let the
advertising issue rest with the Cereal Case alone- filed three additional
complaints premised, in whole or in part, on the anti-competitive effects
of advertising. In November 1972 (amended November 1976) the FTC
challenged the acquisition of United Vintners, one of the two dominant
American wine sellers (second only to Gallo) by Heublein, Inc., the fifth
largest seller of alcoholic beverages in the United States. Part of the
FTC's theory in challenging this product extension form of conglomerate
merger was that the advertising advantages and brand loyalty enjoyed by
both firms would serve to accentuate entry barriers.49
Then, in July 1974, the FTC issued a complaint charging that Bor-
den, Inc. had monopolized the market in reconstituted lemon juice by
marketing its ReaLemon Brand in a manner that could best be character-
ized as predatory advertising. When faced with competition from re-
45. I& at 12. Between 1950 and 1970 approximately 150 brands were introduced, over half of
those after 1960.
46. Id at 13-14.
47. See Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence In the Ready-To-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELL
J. EcON. 305 (1978). Robert Pitofsky, however, denied that the case represented a "widespread
challenge to the general role of advertising." Pitofsky had been Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Protection, FTC, from November 1970 to January 1973. Perhaps he was being protective of the
case's theory by denying its most extreme implications. See Pitofsky, Changing Focus in the Regula-
tion of Advertising in ADVERTISING AND SocImTY 134 (Y. Brozen ed. 1974).
48. Kellogg, 99 F.T.C. at 8.
49. Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385 (1980) (amended complaint).
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gional sellers, ReaLemon's practice was simultaneously to increase the
intensity of its regional advertising campaigns while also reducing prices.
Given the established brand preference for ReaLemon, all the firm
needed to do was to match a competitor's price in order to effectively
underprice it.5o
Finally, in July 1976, the FTC charged that the Maxwell House di-
vision of General Foods was using its dominant position, size, and eco-
nomic power to frustrate the growth of small competitors and to deter
entry. Again, the basic charge was a form of predatory advertising, espe-
cially as directed against Folgers, then a western brand which had tried
to compete in the eastern market dominated by Maxwell House.51
By the mid-1970s, advertising also was regarded by mainstream
legal academics as a serious and important, albeit difficult, antitrust issue.
For example, in a then-influential 1977 hornbook on antitrust, Professor
Sullivan explained that "the competitive effects of advertising ... are
complex."'52 And he noted that "where markets are oligopolistic, adver-
tising may raise entry barriers because heavy advertising expenditures
increase the capital needed for entry. '53 He pointed out, citing the
Clorox case, that a "long continued advertising program may solidify
brand loyalty so that a new producer may have to expend substantially
more to make the same impact." 54 Then, describing without citing the
then-pending Cereal Case, Sullivan added, "Furthermore, in oligopolistic
industries advertising may serve as an outlet for the impulse for rivalry,
thus helping to preserve interdependent pricing; firms hoping to improve
their share of the market may prefer to attempt this through advertising,
which does not threaten super-competitive prices beneficial to all in the
industry. '55 For Sullivan, the result was that "[w]e must conclude over-
all that to the extent non-informational advertising succeeds, it often dis-
aggregates markets-it reduces cross-elasticity of demand between
products-and by doing so has the effect of increasing concentration. '5 6
In November 1978, the FTC decided the ReaLemon case. It agreed
that Borden had been guilty of unlawfully maintaining monopoly power
50. Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978) (complaint). On the pricing advantage gained through
advertising, see portion of opinion labeled "Initial Decision." Id at 716-17.
51. General Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204 (1984) (complaint). Folgers, however, was owned by
Procter and Gamble, which apparently launched a "March to the Sea" to capture 50% of the east-
ern market from Maxwell. Reportedly, small firms were caught in the advertising and pricing war
between the two giants. See Smith, The Rape of Small Business Advertising and the Conglomerates,
11 ANTrrRUsr L. & ECON. REV., 27, 27-29 (1979).
52. L. SULLiVAN, ANTrRusr 307 (1977).
53. Id
54. Id at 308.
55. Id
56. Id at 309.
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in the promotion and sale of reconstituted lemon juice. The heart of that
monopoly power, in the eyes of the FTC, was the dominance of the
ReaLemon brand, which had gained the loyalty of consumers despite the
fact that processed lemon juice was not difficult to manufacture and there
was nothing physically unique about the ReaLemon product.5 7 Thus,
the FTC concluded, the product differentiation achieved through adver-
tising ReaLemon was "spurious" in the sense that it could not be attrib-
uted to any superior qualities of ReaLemon.58 Citing the economist F.M.
Scherer for the proposition that Borden simply was exploiting an "image
advantage," the FTC also adopted Professor Scherer's "value judgment"
that temporary price cutting to eliminate producers handicapped only by
an inferior brand image was "socially undesirable. '59
Commissioner Pitofsky, in a concurring opinion, sought to establish
a narrower basis for the decision, stressing that only in this unusual kind
of predatory pricing case should the Commission depart from requiring
proof of sales by the predator at below-average variable cost. What dis-
tinguished this case for Pitofsky, however, was the same fact that had
been persuasive for the majority of the Commission-ReaLemon's image
advantage-and Pitofsky, like the FTC majority, cited the same passage
from Professor Scherer.60
In 1980, the FTC decided the Heublein case, rejecting the adminis-
trative law judge's decision in 1979 (issued with a 180 page opinion) to
order divestiture.61 The F.T.C. simply found unpersuasive the evidence
presented in Heublein to demonstrate anti-competitive effects. In the
wine market there were "competing products varying significantly in
price, quality and use," 62 a fact which distinguished Heublein from
Clorox or S. OS., where the markets were "composed of low-priced, high
turn-over items lacking significant distinguishing characteristics. ' 63
Nevertheless, Pitofsky, writing for the majority, was at pains to reaffirm
the validity of the "entrenchment" theory of Clorox, referring to the case
as a "seminal" decision,64 and he respectfully cited both Clorox and
57. Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 779 (1978) (summarizing and affirming the decision of the
administrative law judge),
58. IM. at 805.
59. Id at 804.
60. Id at 827-28.
61. Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385, 393 (1980) (initial decision). The decision, by Judge
Berman, concluded that "[a]dvertising and other forms of non-price competition such as merchan-
dising, packaging and label design significantly contribute to brand recognition," and that estab-
lished firms doing a substantial business enjoy "absolute cost advantages" in advertising, to the
detriment of new entrants. Id at 539.
62. Id at 596.
63. Id (addressing the question of advertising efficiencies).
64. Id. at 592.
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S. O.S. as the "decisions pioneering the concept that significant advertis-
ing advantages could violate § 7."65 By carefully distinguishing the facts
in Heublein from both Clorox and S.O.S., Pitofsky apparently sought to
preserve the validity of the advertising entrenchment theory by confining
its scope to markets where advertising really did make all the difference.
Alas, it was too late. There would be only one more victory for
regulation, an ambiguous one that followed massive and overwhelming
defeat. That defeat came with the long-awaited decision in the Cereal
Case.66 In part, the FTC's treatment of the case was a heavy-handed
political rebuke, reflecting the ideological sea change that came in with
the Reagan Administration. The case was tried before an administrative
law judge, Judge Berman, whose decision in Heublein had been rejected
by the Commission.67 In a 250-page opinion Judge Berman, after draw-
ing the narrowest possible negative inferences from the evidence, stressed
the FTC's failure of proof and decided in favor of the cereal companies.
Given the importance of the case, the director of the FTC's Bureau of
Competition filed a notice of intent to appeal.
Then administrations changed. President Reagan appointed James
C. Miller, III who was known to be hostile to the case, as Chairman of
the FTC. Miller in turn appointed Thomas Campbell (now a Congress-
man from California) to head the Bureau of Competition. Campbell
withdrew the notice of intent to appeal, and the full Commission not only
declined to hear further appeal, but also vacated the lengthy initial deci-
sion and ordered that "the Commission's complaint in this matter be,
and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice.
'68
As initially outlined by Wilson, the basic theory of the Cereal Case
had combined a structural analysis of the industry with advertising as a
crucial conduct component. The industry was highly concentrated,
highly profitable, and rapidly growing, yet there had been no new en-
trants between 1950 and 1972. This lack of competition, it was charged,
was not due to fortuity but rather to parallel behavior on the part of
dominant firms, which effectively maintained costly barriers to entry
through the incessant proliferation of new cereal brands that were ac-
companied in each instance by heavy advertising and promotional ex-
penses. Although other issues were raised, the case stood or fell on the
question of product differentiation through brand proliferation. Implicit
in the charge against the industry was a notion of "excess"-of social
65. Id. at 595.
66. Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 269. For a summary of this history, see E. Fox & L. SULLIVAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ANTTRUST 510-11 (1989).
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waste in the form of money spent to purchase mere images-leading to
high profits derived from imagery manipulation rather than "real" qual-
ity or price competition.
6 9
Judge Berman, with his conservative view of the evidence (perhaps a
response to having been overturned in Heublein), was not persuaded that
industry profit levels were as high as the complainants alleged, or that
there had been any deliberate conspiracy or agreement to deter entry or
limit competition. Yet, he did concede that brand proliferation was vir-
tually the only form of competition in the industry. Accordingly, the
entire case necessarily turned on the characterization of competition
based on product differentiation through advertising. In a crucial pas-
sage, Berman refused to label that form of competition any more nega-
tive than price or quality competition:
Brand proliferation is nothing more than the introduction of new
brands which is a legitimate means of competition. Respondents'
brand proliferation is vigorously competitive and.., not in itself un-
lawful. Respondents engaged in intense, unrestrained and uncoordi-
nated competition in the introduction of new products...
Consumers' desire for variety for breakfast is responsible, in large
measure, for the differentiation of RTE cereals. A firm in the [Ready
to Eat] cereal industry must introduce new products in order to remain
profitable and compete for market share.70
In effect, Berman had adopted the position Justice Harlan had ar-
gued: There is no way to distinguish qualities of a product attributable to
image alone (hence misleading and wasteful) from qualities attributable
to "real" difference-for example, lower price, better quality, or easier
availability. Given the impossibility of making that distinction-one
which necessarily entailed a normative judgment about the social value
of advertising-consumer "preference" as registered on the existing mar-
ket must prevail.
The defeat in the Cereal Case still left standing the decisions in
Clorox and ReaLemon. In other words, inexplicable consumer prefer-
ence for Clorox or ReaLemon over chemically identical bleaches or
lemon juices still was consigned, theoretically, to the realm of false im-
agery, whereas the variety in breakfast cereals was a manifestation of
authentic preference and objective reality. That line would not hold.
The Sixth Circuit did affirm the FTC's decision in ReaLemon, accepting
the argument of "unique situation" based on brand identification. 71 Nev-
69. Kellogg, 99 F.T.C. at 240-41 (Judge Berman rejecting the "waste" notion, and refusing to
mandate a "socially optimal level" of advertising).
70. Id. at 256.
71. Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 461 U.S. 940 (1983) (settlement
rendered the case moot).
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ertheless, Judge Cornelia Kennedy, dissenting, argued that the price pre-
mium available to ReaLemon was not a function of monopoly, but rather
was evidence of consumer preference for ReaLemon. She concluded
that "it is not a violation of the antitrust laws for a monopolist to take
advantage of a consumer preference at the expense of its competitors. '72
Confirming Judge Kennedy's perspective with a vengeance, the
FTC, in April, 1984, affirmed a decision by an administrative law judge
to dismiss the complaint against Maxwell House. The opinion by Chair-
man Miller, writing for the majority, refused to equate the fact that "real
or perceived differences among products can build a loyal following"
with "an acknowledgment of entry barriers.
'73
There is no dispute that the effective use of every element of the "mar-
keting mix"-including the maintenance of consistently desirable
product quality as well as the selection of a proper balance of the vari-
ous types of advertising and promotion- contributes to the identity
and success of a brand. Indeed, a company may reap the benefits of
both marketing as well as superior quality by charging retailers a
higher price than its less successful competitors.... But, in and of
itself, this fact is no more a barrier to entry than that the requirement
every coffee producer must make an efficient investment in plant and
equipment. 74
Since ReaLemon, no cases even have suggested that promotional or
advertising advantages can be characterized as anti-competitive for pur-
pose of antitrust law. Moreover, no basis exists for supposing such ad-
vantages would be treated any differently from other production or
distribution efficiencies. Ironically, in fact, the negation of the earlier,
pejorative characterization of advertising set the stage, under current
law, for citing advertising as a positive benefit to claim exemption from
antitrust violation.
Since the mid-1970s the Supreme Court has been steadily con-
tracting the scope of the per se illegality that was so fashionable in the
heyday of liberal formalism. It has done so by calling explicitly for a
balance of efficiencies, by allowing threshold characterization defenses to
kick cases out of the per se category, or by a combination of both. For
example, in the BMI case,75 the most sacred of all per se categories, price
72. Id. at 520. She rejected the view that the FTC could possibly distinguish "rational" from
"irrational" brand preferences, also noting, however, that brand names in some instances serve to
insure quality. Id. at 520 nn.4 & 5.
73. General Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 354 (1984).
74. Id
75. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (issuance of "blanket" license to copy-
righted musical compositions); see also NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). In the
NCAA case, the Court found it inappropriate to apply a per se rule because "this case involves an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
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fixing, was upended in order to accommodate the positive efficiency asso-
ciated with the introduction of a "new product." BMI did represent new
product efficiencies of a dramatic nature, but implicit in the BMI analysis
is the possibility that product differentiation like that involved in the Ce-
real Case may become regarded as a positive efficiency to be balanced
against otherwise anti-competitive behavior and effects.
In the area of vertical non-price restraints, territorial restrictions
may now be upheld,76 and competitors may be disciplined, 77 largely to
prevent those demons of contemporary antitrust drama-the free rid-
ers78-from unjustly trading on the positivity created by virtuous,
hardworking retailers. Usually, the specific positivity that courts are ea-
ger to protect is promotional, a function of advertising. Restraints that
otherwise would be considered anti-competitive are justified for the sole
purpose of nurturing and insulating promotional activity. Manufacturers
are effectively allowed to remove price from the arena of retailer intra-
brand competition; they can confine competition to service and promo-
tion exclusively.
In the area of tie-ins, a per se rule of illegality is giving way to a
more complex test under Jefferson Parish Hospital 79 where Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion laid out a threshold test for treating tie-
ins under a rule-of-reason analysis. Her test included "a coherent eco-
nomic basis for treating the products as distinct" 80 and some kind of
anti-competitive effect in the tied product market. While rightly re-
jecting some of the fallacious assumptions of liberal formalism,81 the new
approach to tie-ins is calculated to give support to advertising. For ex-
ample, variable proportion tie-ins of the kind once condemned under
all." Id. at 100. The "product" in question was college football: The key point, for our argument, is
that the Court was willing to listen to claims (which it ended up rejecting in that case) that otherwise
anti-competitive practices might be justified to preserve the "integrity" of the "product." See id. at
101.
The tradition of allowing a threshold characterization defense, even in a price-fixing case, dates
back to an opinion by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918); yet, the refusal to balance efficiencies in price-fixing cases had been well established prior to
BMI, since Justice Douglas' opinion in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940).
76. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
77. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (agreement to termi-
nate a price-cutter).
78. For a discussion of the "free rider" problem in the specific context of advertising expendi-
tures, see H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 114-16 (1985).
79. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
80. Id. at 41 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81. For a good discussion of the "leverage" fallacy, see H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at
222-24.
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Chicken Delight 8 2 allow for maximum return, through discriminatory
prices, on the costs sunk in developing and promoting a brand name. If
the brand name imagery is successful, then there is no coherent way to
separate trademark "image" from "real" ingredients, and since sales are
increased through such a scheme, efficiency has been promoted.
Under the reign of liberal formalism, horizontal mergers were con-
demned explicitly because they created efficiencies and thereby hampered
local small-firm competition. The Celler-Kefauver Amendments were
read as stating a clear preference for decentralization, even at the cost of
higher prices or lower quality. According to that analysis, national ad-
vertising was treated as one of the economies of scale that threaten small
business: For example, the district court in Brown Shoe stated:
[I]ndependent retailers of shoes are having a harder and harder time in
competing with company-owned and company-controlled retail out-
lets. National advertising by large concerns has increased their brand
name acceptability and retail stores handling the brand named shoes
have a definite advertising advantage. Company-owned and company-
controlled retail stores have definite advantages in buying and credit;
they have further advantages in advertising, insurance, inventory con-
trol .... 83
Thus, while advertising advantages were in effect recognized by the
Supreme Court as "efficiencies," they were treated nevertheless as a nega-
tivity; the Court "resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization.
' '84
The rule that mergers should be condemned because they produce
efficiencies clearly has been abandoned. The harder question now is the
extent to which efficiency can be used as a defense in a horizontal merger
suit. The 1984 Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines announce that
the DOJ will not recognize a general efficiency defense, but will consider
"clear and convincing evidence that a merger will achieve efficiencies." 85
Nothing in the guidelines suggests that advertising would not be included
in such a "consideration."
86
82. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972). Chicken Delight required its franchisees, as a condition of using its name, symbols, and
system of operation, to purchase essential cooking equipment, dry-mix food items, and trademark-
bearing packaging, exclusively from Chicken Delight, and at higher-than-market prices for such
items.
83. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff'd, 370 U.S.
294 (1962).
84. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344.
85. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, §§ 3.5, 4.24 (June 14, 1984), 49 Fed. Reg.
26,823, 26,834 (1984).
86. Id. at 26,834, 26,837.
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II. THE ECONOMICS OF THE RISE AND FALL OF ADVERTISnIG AS
AN ANTITRUST ISSUE
The legal history related above developed within a context of eco-
nomic theory. Predictably, the legal theorists on both sides borrowed
their positions from economists who had debated the relationship be-
tween advertising, competition, and consumer welfare.8 7
The basic structure of the debate was set in 1933 by Joan Robinson's
influential work, The Economics of Imperfect Competition. 8 8 Central to
market theory and to the model of pure competition is the notion that a
knowledgeable consumer will choose to pay less rather than more for the
same item. As Robinson recognized, however, to state that self-evident
proposition is to introduce a glitch: No concept is more problematic in
our experiential world than the concept "same." As a result, profit-seek-
ing sellers of consumer goods will try to distinguish their products from
ostensibly similar ones in order to build around themselves a protective
wall of cross- inelasticity, thereby gaining some control over price and
hence increasing their profits. In situations in which producers can gain
nothing more through cost-cutting (traditional productive efficiencies) or
objective qualitative improvement (the proverbial better mousetrap), the
obvious basis for differentiation lies in advertising.
Basic to the Robinson description of imperfect competition was the
notion of market break-up, or fragmentation. A firm could alter the de-
mand curve for its own product, thereby increasing sales at each output
level, through "expenditure on advertisement" in the same manner as
through a reduction in price. The effect of the advertising is that it "en-
sures that not all the customers, who are attached in varying degrees to a
particular firm by the advantages which it offers them, will immediately
forsake it for a rival who offers similar goods at an infinitesimally smaller
price,"8 9 as they would under conditions of perfect competition, where
goods are presumed to be identical. As Robinson noted, "In the real
world when a firm finds that the market is becoming uncomfortably per-
87. This debate has been going on for a long time, and has continued right up to the present.
For a sampling of the literature, see M. ALBION & P. FARRIS, THE ADVERTISING CONTROVERSY:
EVIDENCE ON THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING (1981); J. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND
COMPETITION (1967); P. BLOOM, ADVERTISING, COMPETITION, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SIMULA-
TION STUDY (1976); J. FERGUSON, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION: THEORY, MEASUREMENT,
FACT (1974); E. LEVER, ADVERTISING AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1947); R. MCAULIFFE, ADVER-
TISING, COMPETITION, AND PUBLIC POLICY: THEORIES AND NEW EVIDENCE (1987); W. D.
REEKIE, THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING (1981); Thomas, Advertising in Consumer Goods Indus-
tries: Durability, Economies of Scalk and Heterogeneity, 32 J. L. & EON. 163 (1989). The McAu-
liffe volume, supra, contains a comprehensive bibliography at 107-12.
88. J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933). See generally M.
TURNER, JOAN ROBINSON AND THE AMERICANS (1989).
89. J. ROBINSON, supra note 88, at 90; see also id. at 21.
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feet it can resort to advertisement and other devices which attach partic-
ular customers more firmly to itself."90
This analysis suggested that advertising and other related promo-
tional activities amount to a peculiar form of competitive activity, given
their capacity to transform similarity into difference and, in so doing, to
segregate product markets. From an antitrust perspective, the narrow-
est issue raised is whether such practices produce-in efficiency terms-
an anti-competitive effect. More specifically, the question is whether and
how advertising can enhance a firm's capacity to restrict output and raise
prices. One indication of such a problem would be an industry charac-
terized by consistently high profits over time, since according to normal
economic assumptions, high profits would draw new entrants. Thus, the
issue of advertising quickly became one of entry barriers.
On this topic, the guru of subsequent liberal economists was Joe
Bain, whose Barriers to New Competition 91 was first published in 1956.
Bain began with the assumption of "free or easy entry" so central to
conventional price theory, the assumption that in "markets with many
small sellers, easy entry in the long run will force price to equality with
minimal average costs and will bring output to a level sufficient for sup-
plying all demands at this price."' 92 When confronted with "conditions
of entry [that were] other than easy," he noted, conventional price theory
became "inexplicit, cryptic or silent."193 Accordingly, Bain set out to in-
vestigate the conditions that would inhibit new entry and thereby contra-
dict the logic of competitive price theory. In his crucial initial definition,
90. Id at 101. There exists a parallel line of economic thought, dating back to Hotelling's
famous spatial model for a product-differentiated market, see Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39
ECON. J. 41 (1929), as refined by Lancaster, see Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer Theory, 74
J. POL. ECON. 132 (1966). This approach was refined and applied by economist Richard Schmalen-
see to support the case against the cereal industry, and, especially, to support the remedy of
mandatory trademark licensing in that case. See Schmalensee, supra note 47; see also F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 258-60 & n.116 (2d ed. 1980).
Ironically, the most recent attempt to deploy the theory in a legal setting appears in an article
by the same Thomas Campbell who played such a key role in terminating the Cereal Case (for a
discussion, see supra text accompanying note 68), later became a law professor at Stanford, and is
now a Member of Congress. Relying on the spatial model of product differentiation, Campbell ar-
gues for a limited exception to the presumption against predation that is so prevalent in current
literature. Yet, his unwillingness to question the social value of product differentiation, thereby
positing it as utility-enhancing, along with his insistence on the narrowest definition of entry barrier,
renders the argument paradoxical. See Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case
ofNonfungible Goods, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 1625 (1987). Contrast Rasmusen & Wiley, Antitrust and
Spatial Predation: A Response to Thomas J. Campbell, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1015, 1017 (1989)
(claiming that "judges will err if they take Campbell's advice").
91. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (2d ed. 1962).
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id
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Bain stated that he would evaluate "condition of entry," which he also
called "state of potential competition," by assessing "the advantages of
established sellers in an industry over potential entrant sellers, these ad-
vantages being reflected in the extent to which established sellers can
persistently raise their prices above a competitive level without attracting
new firms to enter the industry."1
94
Among the barriers to entry identified by Bain were those erected by
successful advertising, which produces extreme product differentiation.
In fact, Bain concluded that "the main culprit in establishing excessive or
very high barriers to entry would appear to be product differentiation." 95
He found this conclusion true in the five industries he studied:
automobiles, typewriters, quality fountain pens, liquor, and cigarettes.
Nevertheless, having identified an anti-competitive "problem," Bain
readily conceded the difficulty of finding an easy solution:
[A] feasible type of policy to deal with the problem is not easily appar-
ent. There is an evident propensity of the profit-seeking enterprise to
attempt to enhance profits through product differentiation, via the ad-
vantages it gives it over both established rivals and potential rivals.
Moreover, the enterprise tends to pursue a product-differentiation pol-
icy unilaterally, and without the necessity of any sort of consensual
action that might run counter to laws against collusion or concert of
action by competitors. Furthermore, the psychology of consumers is
very evidently such that they are frequently susceptible to the blan-
dishments of product-differentiating sellers, so that we come at last to
a presumably fairly stable characteristic of human nature as the root of
the trouble. For all of these reasons, it is difficult to attack this sort of
barrier to entry under laws in the anti-monopoly or anti-collusion tra-
dition, or to legislate it away. Then too, it is difficult to organize any
substantial political support for measures designed to attack extremes
of product differentiation.
96
Bain's own policy proposals were thus tentative. First, where prod-
uct differentiation advantages rested on integration, Bain suggested disin-
tegration and prohibition of further integration as long as there were no
resulting "real" diseconomies. Second, he proposed restrictions or taxes
on advertising; and third, he proposed objective product information to
counteract the effects of advertising.
Picking up on the pioneering work of Bain, liberal economists of the
1970s translated his concerns into the specific antitrust agenda described
in Part I. Central to their agenda was the removal or reduction of entry
barriers, as defined by Bain, that were achieved through advertising and
product differentiation. Perhaps the most influential was Professor
94. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis omitted).
95. Id. at 204.
96. Id. at 216.
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Scherer, whose Industrial Market Structure and Economic Perform-
ance97 first appeared in 1970 and was reissued in 1980. Scherer not only
elaborated the theory of "entry deterrence through product differentia-
tion," but also included an entire chapter called "Product Differentia-
tion, Market Structure, and Competition," 98 in which he affirmed with a
vengeance the result in Clorox, citing his own small empirical survey of
bleach prices in Chicago. Knowing that bleaches are chemically identi-
cal, he was incredulous to discover that consumers really did pay far
more for the Clorox brand. Similarly, Scherer praised the result in the
ReaLemon case, quoting a passage from the initial decision elaborating
ReaLemon's "almost imaginary superiority... in the mind of the con-
sumer." 99 He also noted with approval the work of economist and FTC
consultant Richard Schmalensee, who was developing the economic the-
ory of the Cereal Case and basing it explicitly on the work of Bain and of
Scherer himself. 0°
Conservative economists, predictably enough, responded by taking a
contrary position on the question of advertising. This debate was the
topic of an historic (in retrospect, for antitrust literature, a cross-roads)
conference sponsored by Columbia Law School in 1974, later published
as Industrial Concentration and the New Learning. 10 1 The authors and
participants included leading liberal and conservative antitrust theorists
from the disciplines of both law and economics. 10 2 On the liberal side,
for example, were Scherer, Pitofsky, Turner, and Michael Mann. On the
conservative side were Yale Brozen, Ronald Coase, Harold Demsetz,
Robert Bork, and Richard Posner. The conference addressed five sub-
stantive issues related to industrial concentration, one of which was "Ad-
vertising as an Impediment to Competition." 10 3
Taking the liberal position on advertising, Michael Mann, following
the work of Bain, argued that "advertising and concentration may inter-
act, feeding upon one another, with the result that advertising and con-
centration will be positively related." He asserted that "advertising may
contribute to the perpetuation of an oligopoly market structure" because
97. F. SCHERER, supra note 90.
98. See id. at 258-60, 375-404.
99. Id. at 382 & n.25 (quoting Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 709 (1978)).
100. Id. at 258-60 & n.l 16; see Schmalensee, supra note 47.
101. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 8.
102. For a list of conference authors and participants, see id. at 457-64.
103. Advertising as an Impediment to Competition, in id. at 114-61 (a chapter comprised of es-
says by Brozen and Mann, as well as a panel discussion).
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it "stabilizes consumer purchasing habits" and thus serves to retard
entry. 104
Yale Brozen, however, in his persuasive presentation, challenged all
the received liberal wisdom on the question of advertising. 05 In particu-
lar, he refuted the basic entry barrier theory, arguing that in the imper-
fect markets that exist in the real world, the introduction of advertising
actually increases competition. This position represented a dramatic and
brilliant reversal of the Robinson sequence. Robinson had taken the
model of perfect competition as a presumed analytic starting point and
had then described advertising as an (implicitly subsequent) distortion of
that model.10 6 That basic framework had provided the structure for the
whole liberal critique of advertising. Brozen pointed out, however, that
the relevant starting point should be the real world, not an abstract
model of unrealistically "perfect" competition.
Brozen's argument might be ultimately self-destructive: What, ex-
actly, is allocative efficiency itself, absent a model of perfect competition
as reference point? Nevertheless, Brozen effectively pointed out that in
the real world the possibility of entry may depend upon the availability
of advertising to introduce new products. Rather than deterring entry,
advertising may be a necessary precondition for entry. Furthermore,
Brozen was able to cite instances when the introduction of advertising
actually had increased competition and thereby lowered prices, or, con-
versely, where the abolition of advertising had reduced competition. 0
7
He also responded to the charge that high profits correlate with high
advertising expenditures by contending that such profit measurement
was based on fallacious accounting methods.
Two of the issues raised by the Brozen/Mann debate and subse-
quent scholarly literature seem intractable. The first is whether advertis-
ing can, in some final, universal sense, be labeled either pro- or anti-
competitive. Brozen, for example, correctly had chided the other side for
the "mistaking of association or correlation with causation."' 0 8 He nev-
ertheless indulged in some shoddy empiricism of his own, drawing grand
generalizations from the facts of peculiar limiting cases.' 0 9 Given an ab-
solute absence (or prohibition) of advertising at time To, its introduction
at time T is likely to have a dramatic effect on the industry. This seems
104. Mann, Advertising, Concentration, and Profitability: The State of Knowledge and Directions
for Public Policy, in id. at 137, 140-41.
105. Brozen, Entry Barriers: Advertising and Product Differentiation, in id. at 115-37.
106. J. ROBINSON, supra note 88, at 90; see supra text accompanying note 89.
107. Brozen, supra note 105, at 120-23.
108. Id. at 119.
109. Id. at 120-23.
Vol. 1990:321]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
to be the case wih the eyeglass study, cited repeatedly by Brozen and
other conservative economists, in which introduction of advertising low-
ered prices. The same may be said for Brozen's citation of a similar se-
quence in the toy industry, when national advertising by manufacturers,
during a period of rapid transition, increased price competition among
retailers, displacing the monopoly position of local sellers and thereby
reducing prices paid by consumers. 110 Yet, the beneficial effect of adver-
tising in reducing prices in the early time interval in no way speaks to
whether it is pro- or anti-competitive in later intervals when price compe-
tition has ceased and advertising itself has become the principal means of
competition. Antitrust liberals like Pitofsky, Elman, and Turner always
had been willing to concede the benefits of advertising in the first inter-
val, questioning only its competitive effects in later intervals.111
That advertising, when originally introduced, can bring vigor and
benefits to a market might apply to the current situation in Eastern Eu-
rope, where there is a need for markets to develop some brand identifica-
tion through advertising so as to help give competitive life to otherwise
stagnant economies. 1 2 That fact, however true, does not necessarily en-
tail blanket endorsement of all American advertising practices. The real
question, which Brozen's studies cannot answer, is whether a coherent
line can be drawn between pro-competitive and anti-competitive advertis-
ing. To assess the long-run competitive effects of advertising we must
look to criteria other than occasional short-run price reductions.
A second issue which both sides agree is intractable is whether ad-
vertising causes concentration, concentration causes advertising, or both,
or neither.1 13 It may well be that numerous forces or behaviors, includ-
ing antitrust law itself, led to the oligopolistic character of many Ameri-
can industries.114 Once oligopoly was established, advertising may
simply have been the mode of competition most suited to the price stabil-
ity associated with such structures. Any resulting association between
oligopoly and high advertising budgets may tell us nothing about causa-
tion. On the other hand, given the national scope of so many consumer
product markets, it still may be true that a threshold advertising budget
110. See id. at 122. Ironically, the vertical restraints conservative economists now say should be
permitted (see sources cited supra notes 77-78) lessen the price-reducing effects those economists
have so often celebrated in the toy study.
I 11. See, eg., Pitofsky, supra note 47.
112. This need had been acknowledged well before the recent changes in Eastern Europe. See L.
BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 4-5 (1984).
113. E.g., M. ALBION & P. FARRIS, supra note 87 at 56-68 (discussing the competitive effects of
advertising); see also W. REEKIE, supra note 87, at 97-115.
114. For this point, and a number of other useful insights, see Dewey, Introduction, in INDUS-
TRIAL COMPETITION, supra note 8, at 1-14.
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serves, at the very least, to increase the minimum optimal size in many
industries, to the disadvantage of small firms or potential entrants (given
the real-world constraints of a less than perfect market for capital).
In other words, to concede the ultimate intractability of causation at
a general level does not resolve whether or not, in a particular context,
the costs specifically associated with product differentiation should be re-
garded as barriers to entry (in the precise sense of being anti-competi-
tive). Recognizing that fact, economists now avoid the abstract question
of causation but treat the correct definition of entry barrier as central to
the whole economic debate about advertising. Whereas Brozen had side-
stepped the question, modem conservatives like Stigler have, no less than
the liberals, understood its centrality; but few liberals or conservatives
have conceded the extent to which the question of entry barrier is in fact
a question about the social and psychological meaning of advertising
itself.
The Cereal Case provides a dramatic illustration of the theoretical
dilemma. Between 1950 and 1972, despite extraordinarily rapid growth,
no new firms entered the cereal industry, while existing firms dramati-
cally increased the number of brands they made available to consumers
and consistently earned high profits. Common sense would suggest that
capital, attracted by the smell of profit, should have rushed into the mar-
ket unless some "artificial" barrier kept them out. Joe Bain certainly
would have regarded the extensive brand proliferation by industry lead-
ers as that "barrier." In the sense that advertising served to increase the
actual (and also psychological) cost of entry, the point is indisputable.
But whether those costs of entry are to be regarded economically as bar-
riers is more problematic. It is almost too trite to say that "[s]uperior
efficiency is the world's greatest entry barrier," 115 but the point made by
that phrase is sound. Unless we return to the Brown Shoe view that all
increased economies of scale enjoyed by large firms are anti-competitive
because they put small firms at a disadvantage, 1 6 we have to ask whether
economies achieved through advertising are in some sense different from
other production or distribution economies.
First, though, we must address the particularity of cost increases to
determine whether they should qualify as entry barriers, or whether
Bain's definition should be rejected altogether. Rejecting Bain's defini-
tion is exactly what Stigler has done, by using a definition of entry barrier
that finds no unfairness in requiring entrants to bear all costs previously
115. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at 306 (1985).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
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borne by incumbents-including advertising costs. 117 A true entry bar-
rier, in these terms, is a "cost of producing (at some or every rate of
output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry
but is not borne by firms already in the industry." 118 For Stigler, there
may be short-ran "time-lag" impediments to entry, but there are no long-
term barriers to entry unless incumbents possess an advantage (such as
control over a resource) that will never be available to entrants. Such
impediments as market size limitations or economies of scale are thus not
regarded as entry barriers since they are just neutral consequences of
market conditions or cost/output relationships.
Even without accepting Stigler's critique, one must concede that
Bain's entry barrier definition creates the problem of requiring a compar-
ison between the price charged by incumbents and a competitive price. 19
But if the basic purpose of advertising is to persuade consumers that they
are buying something "different," then with what do we compare the
price of the advertised brand? While it may be possible to find a refer-
ence for some products, such as liquid bleach, most do not lend them-
selves to such ready comparison. In other words, are there generic Froot
Loops? The Robinson-Bain approach almost requires a Platonic form of
Froot Loops that pre-exists and serves as a pricing reference point for the
Kellogg's version of Froot Loops. Bain's analysis suffers because there
is no such thing-as the conservatives have correctly pointed out.
Moreover, we cannot conclude that an additional cost is an inappro-
priate barrier to entry unless we assume it is not matched by an at least
equal enhancement of value; in short, we must deny that product differ-
entiation is a productive efficiency before we can call it a barrier to entry.
The FTC did exactly that with advertising economies of scale in Clorox
and with brand preference in ReaLemon. Yet, the basis upon which the
liberals denied that value enhancement remains elusive. Since consumers
do register a preference for brand names in their purchases, we must
have some independent basis for judging their preference "false" if we are
to distinguish advertising efficiencies from other efficiencies for purposes
of defining entry barriers.
On the other hand, treating all costs borne by successful incumbents
as fungible, as does Stigler, simply assimilates advertising to the general-
117. For a good presentation of the theoretical debate, see R. McAULIFFE, supra note 87, at 2-
27. See also Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 47 (1982) (discussing Bain's, Stigler's,
and Ferguson's definitions of entry barriers). The FTC has recently adopted the Stigler definition on
the basis of its having been "widely accepted in the legal and economic communities." See Echlin
Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 485 (1985).
118. G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUsTRY 67 (1983).
119. See J. BAIN, supra note 91, at 3.
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ity of production costs, thereby denying its particularity altogether. Stig-
ler, in effect, uses his definition of entry barriers to avoid discussion of the
real issue, which is the extent to which one can characterize advertising
as similar to or different from other production costs, and what implica-
tions can be drawn from that characterization. This point has been made
by conservative economist Harold Demsetz, in his discussion of the effort
to define entry barriers generally. As Demsetz shrewdly argues, any
legal entitlement is an entry barrier in the sense that it confers a secured
advantage on the one who owns the entitlement. Demsetz' argument ef-
fectively demolishes the category "entry barrier," as such, as a tool of
analysis, and thereby highlights the important question, which is whether
or not a particular entitlement serves some valuable social goal-a deci-
sion which cannot be reached by quibbling over the logically correct defi-
nition of "barrier" in the abstract. As Demsetz states, "The issue faced
by the attempt to implement a policy toward barriers is that of defining
which costs of undertaking activities are socially desirable and which are
not.... The valuation process must necessarily be one that is rich in
intuition and faith, and poor in discemable measurements." 120
At this point, one must ask what advertising is and how it works.
Curiously, that issue is implicit in the accounting problem noted by
Brozen,' 21 which also figured significantly in the Cereal Case. 122 Those
who claimed the most excessive profit levels for Kellogg did so by com-
puting annual profits as a percentage of assets, with advertising treated as
an annual expense. At the other extreme were those who claimed that
advertising created capital value that should be added to the base against
which profit rate is computed, thereby reducing the profit ratio.' 23
Buried in this accounting debate is the basic question of how adver-
tising works. The current-expense model presumes short consumer re-
tention spans, rapid dissipation of effects, and the need for frequent and
regular reinforcement. If such is the case, even short-run entry should
not be a great problem, since entrants can deploy their own advertising
120. Demsetz, supra note 117, at 56.
121. Brozen, Entry Barrier" Advertising and Product Differentiation, in INDUSTRIAL COMPETI-
TION, supra note 8, at 123-26; see RL McAuriM, supra note 87, at 47-50 (discusses measuring
profitability); see also Demsetz, Accountingfor Advertising as a Barrier to Entry, 52 . Bus. 345, 357
(1979) ("the evidence reported in this study supports the existence of an accounting artifact that
yields a positive correlation between profit rates and advertising intensity and fails to support the
belief that advertising investments derive their value from the creation of barriers to entry"); Fisher
& McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits 73 AM. ECON.
REV. 82, 90 (1983) ("there is no way in which one can look at accounting rates of return and infer
anything about relative economic profitability").
122. Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 198-227, 259-61 (1982).
123. Ironically, the issue flips around when the question is the deductibility of advertising ex-
penditures as a current expense, as opposed to long-term amortization as capital.
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as effectively as incumbents. The capital asset model, on the other hand,
presumes long-term effect and accounts for attitudes like brand loyalty.
Both models may be correct, depending on the context. In some
cases, perhaps, long-term effects could be sustained, as when brand
names become generic names (practically or legally)- such as Kleenex,
Thermos bottles, cellophane, or even Clorox. Yet heavy advertising by
one firm begets heavy advertising by a competitor, dissipating the long-
term effects of the first ad campaign and leading to constant, retaliatory
defensive advertising. At that point the long-term/short-term distinction
is a hard one to draw, and a seemingly dry debate about accounting be-
comes a debate about what goes on in people's heads. Inevitably, too, we
circle back to the underlying question: Is competition in the arena of
advertising-image competition-as "real" as price and quality competi-
tion, or is it somehow different?
To answer that question economists are pushed reluctantly beyond
the borders of their discipline, since they are forced to appeal to non-
economic criteria to characterize advertising.124 These criteria, too often
unacknowledged, have affected both the accounting and the entry barrier
debate, and inevitably affect our definition of competition itself.
The liberal economists, seeking to use advertising as the handle by
which to attack concentration, allowed their basic contempt for the
whole enterprise to show through. 125 Bain was somewhat restrained in
describing the "blandishments of product-differentiating sellers" to
124. Nevertheless, economists continue to try to produce conclusions about, for example, the
socially optimal level of advertising, from within their own discipline. See, eg., Dixit & Norman,
Advertising and Welfare, 9 BELL 1. ECON. 1 (1978); Dixit & Norman, Advertising and Welfare:
Reply, 10 BELL J. ECON. 728 (1979); Dixit & Norman, Advertising and Welfare: Another Reply, 11
BELL J. ECON. 753 (1980). The authors concede that "[t]he real point at issue is, therefore, whether
advertising is itself an object of preferences, or whether it merely shifts preferences over goods."
Dixit & Norman, Advertising and Welfare Reply, supra, at 729. To the extent that this issue is
empirical rather than definitional, it seems hardly answerable without appealing to criteria outside
the domain of economics.
125. The tradition goes all the way back to Arthur Pigou, who firmly believed in the distinction
between "informative" and "competitive" advertising, with the latter, the "persuasive" category,
serving to do no more than move demand from one firm to another. He therefore regarded persua-
sive advertising as wasteful, and thought that the waste might be avoided through prohibition or
taxation. See A. PiGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 196-200 (1932).
Another good illustration is John Kenneth Galbraith, when he turns his rabid eloquence to the
topic of advertising:
In economics wants are held to emerge from deep within the human psyche.
... So long as wants are original with the consumer, their satisfaction serves the
highest of human purposes. Specifically, an original, inherent need is being satisfied. And
economics as a subject matter or science thus becomes basic to the highest human service.
But the foregoing holds only if wants cannot be created, cultivated, shaped, deepened
or otherwise induced. Heaven forbid that wants should have their source in the producer
of the product or service as aided and guided by his advertising agency.
[Vol. 1990:321
EFFICIENCY AND IMAGE
which consumers were "susceptible"; consumer "psychology" and
"human nature" were thus the "root of the trouble." 126 Scherer was
even more extreme in his (elitist) contempt for American consumerism.
For example, responding to the argument that advertising is a positivity
because it has subsidized news media and television broadcasting,
Scherer notes:
Consumer goods advertisers generally favor media that will transmit
their message to the largest relevant audience, and the media respond
by attempting to maximize audience size through an appeal to the low-
est common denominator. The result is the scandal sheet and televi-
sion's "vast wasteland" .... Indeed, many TV programs are of such
low intellectual caliber that the commercials stand out as a refresh-
ingly sophisticated interlude.
127
Both Bain and Scherer also start with an assumed distinction be-
tween information and persuasion and between reality and image. While
conceding that, because of regulation, ads rarely contain outright lies,
Scherer describes the "new and more subtle ways of 'puffing' "by which
consumers are "gulled," noting that "advertisers would not try to mis-
lead if they thought they were convincing no one." 128 Scherer's position,
of course, depends on an essentialist conception of reality as separate
from the market image. 129 The liberal's quest for economic "reality" is
like the Marxist quest for use value instead of exchange value, or like the
scientific positivist's belief in the fact/value distinction. The genius of
advertising is that it occupies a space somewhere between fact and value,
all-too-obviously collapsing them into each other.
On the other hand, conservative economists are equally guilty of
invoking extra-disciplinary presuppositions. At their critical best they
carry on the realist tradition by undermining the formalist positivism of
the liberals. Having done so, however, they then display all-too-quickly
their own phobic avoidance of messy social context: Seeking to justify all
From the standpoint of strict economic orthodoxy, advertising verges dangerously on
the subversive.
Galbraith, Economics and Advertising: Exercise in Denial, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 9, 1988, at 81.
126. J. BAIN, supra note 91, at 216.
127. F. SCHERER, supra note 90, at 379.
128. Id. at 380.
129. He is in good company on this issue. He shared the belief with the revered Alfred Marshall,
founder of neoclassical economics. Marshall distinguished between "constructive," or "informa-
tive," advertisements, and those that were "combative," that is, "competitive," "persuasive," or
"manipulative." While he saw as constructive those advertisements that were designed to "draw the
attention of people to opportunities for buying or selling of which they may be willing to avail
themselves," especially those that were needed for explaining to people generally the claims of some
new thing which is capable of supplying a great but latent want, he concluded that the "mainly
combative" ads "generally involved social waste." This account is taken from E. LEVER, supra note
87, at 47 (a spirited defense of advertising).
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advertising, they retreat into their own presupposed formalist categories.
One conservative ploy has been to treat all advertising as information,
which enhances consumer satisfaction by reducing search costs, espe-
cially in the case of so-called experience goods, which would otherwise
require consumers to waste valuable time appraising the merits of com-
peting goods. For example, Richard Posner at the Columbia conference
invoked the legendary "law of excluded middle" 130 associated with logi-
cal positivism, demanding to know whether advertising was "false" or
"truthful," 131 in an apparent refusal to acknowledge that advertising lies
somewhere between, or perhaps outside, either category. Some conserva-
tives actually concede that there is no clear line between the categories,
but then proceed to treat advertising as information in an effort to avoid
the issue. 1
32
More sophisticated conservative economists recognize that the in-
formation ploy is shaky at best, and focus instead on what consumers are
buying when they buy goods differentiated by advertising. A conven-
tional liberal analysis, for example, would argue that successful advertis-
ing shifts the demand curve for the product, thereby persuading
consumers to pay higher prices at each output level. The sophisticated
conservative critique is to challenge that notion of product, suggesting
that the second demand curve is the undistorted and accurate onefor the
advertised commodity and bears no necessary comparative relationship to
any other hypothetical demand curve. 133
This point, however, leads the conservatives to the extreme position
that "taste" is exogenous to the market-that advertisers are diligent, yet
ultimately passive, caterers to pre-existing wants. "Want" cannot be
critically examined as a social phenomenon, but can only be traced,
mechanistically, in the self-referencing "facts" of market purchase data.
In other words, rejecting the essentialist reality of value, they then resort
130. See C. ALLENDOERFER & C. OAKLEY, PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS 20 (1955); B. Rus-
SELL, PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS 18 (Norton paperback ed. 1964).
131. See INDusTRAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 8, at 156.
132. See, e.g., Nagle, Do Advertising-Profitability Studies Really Show That Advertising Creates a
Barrier to Entry?, 24 J. L. & ECON. 333 (1981) ("Opinions diverge, in part, over advertising's truth-
fulness, its informativeness, and the optimality of its supply."); Nelson, Advertising as Information,
82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 730 (1974) (discussing the impact of advertising's information on "search
qualities" and "experience qualities" of products). See also R. MCAULIFE, supra note 87, at 33-45.
133. See, ag., Nichols, Advertising and Economic Welfare, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 213, 214 (1985)
("The Stigler-Becker framework enables us to interpret an apparent shift in the product demand
curve as a movement along a characteristic demand cuive induced by increased advertising's reduc-
tion in the shadow price of the characteristic."); see also R. MCAULIFFE, supra note 87, at 77-78




to an essentialist definition of taste as ahistorical, acultural reality.134
The fact that consumers flock to buy advertised goods thus is simply
evidence that advertisers have appealed successfully to a pre-existing
preference for the images conveyed in the advertisements. If consumers
choose to buy images, then it is their sovereign autonomous right to do
so. That position, of course, is a mere tautology: 135 Because advertising
works, there is no basis upon which to evaluate it in relation to the sup-
posed goal of competition. The terms of the debate simply are aban-
doned in complete and abject deference to the existing order.13
6
134. See Stigler & Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. EcoN. REv. 76 (1977).
In this article, Stigler and Becker, relying for their choice on "comparative analytical productivi-
ties," choose a model that posits "taste" as universal and invariant between people. The messiness of
cultural reality creeps back in, however, when the authors concede that consumer behavior is af-
fected by "knowledge," and that "knowledge, whether real or fancied, is produced by the advertising
of producers." Id. at 84. Our position is that one cannot say anything meaningful about the particu-
larity of advertising without addressing, rather than holding constant, the very complicated, and
perhaps non-dichotomous, category of "real or fancied."
135. See Leibenstein, Microeconomics and X-Efficiency Theory, in THE CRmIs IN EcONOMIC
THEORY 97, 100 (D. Bell & I. Kristol eds. 1981); see also Kristol, Rationalism in Economics, in id at
201, 214-15 (discussing singularity and plurality of preferences in consumerism). Consider the ap-
proach of an influential textbook:
Perhaps the most important technique of non-price competition is advertising. In the
United States, and increasingly in European countries, advertising is the uniformly most
accepted and acceptable method of attracting customers, at least to entrepreneurs if not to
economists. The "pros and cons" of advertising expenditure have been argued at length;
the argument is likely to continue because the question at stake is a moot one. But for
good or not, advertising is an established practice that is presumably considered worth-
while by entrepreneurs; otherwise they would not continue to spend billions of dollars
annually on this type of non-price competition.
J. GOULD & E. LAZEAR, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 405 (6th ed. 1989).
136. Some economists, including Lester Thurow, acknowledge the seriousness of the issue: "As
things now stand, the price-auction model is silent about how preferences are formed. In theory they
simply exist-fully developed and immutable.... So some real theory of preference formation has
to lie at the heart of the rebuilding effort in economics." L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS:
THE STATE OF EONOMIcS 219-20 (1983).
Consider a deliberate and pervasive effort to alter preferences-advertising. Not wanting to
recognize what is happening, the economics profession has a very ambivalent attitude toward it.
Advertising is divided into good advertising (information) and bad advertising (persuasive), but most
advertising is clearly designed to persuade, not to inform. Some economists see advertising as a
pernicious attempt to distort perfectly good "home-grown" preferences, while others consider it a
not very successful attempt to alter those same perfectly good "home-grown" preferences and there-
fore not anything worth worrying about. In either case, if true preferences are being "distorted,"
advertising is a market imperfection that must be eliminated.
Neither view of advertising confronts the real problem. Preferences are not being distorted by
advertising, but are instead being formed endogenously in the market by a wide variety of social
forces that include deliberate advertising. There is no such thing as "true" independent individual
preferences. Human preferences are like an onion, because when the layers of social influence are
peeled away, nothing is left. So the rock of stable preferences on which equilibrium price-auction
markets are founded is in fact little more than quicksand. Id
As Schmalensee noted: "If the source of Rea.emon's premium brand status lay in consumer
perceptions that it tasted better than other brands, it could be argued that the problem was irration-
ality, not ignorance. If consumers are irrational in any deep sense, the welfare-economics case for
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III. ADVERTISING AS CULTURAL REALITY
The static assumptions of both liberals and conservative collapse
when viewed in light of the social history of advertising. We cannot offer
a complete account of that history, but we do want to draw upon it to
suggest the complexity of the normative judgments that must be made, a
complexity missed if one fails to see advertising as a social phenomenon.
History suggests that the dichotomous categories now used by econo-
mists simply do not capture the dialectical reality of advertising. For
example, advertising is neither an all-powerful instrument of social con-
trol nor a pure, democratic expression of consumer autonomy: Advertis-
ing has been, simultaneously, both controlling and liberating. Similarly,
taste cannot be wholly engineered, yet it also does not exist in splendid,
ahistoric exogenism. The "value" created by advertising is neither pure
"image" nor simple "fact"; and, to use Stigler's delicately elided distinc-
tion, the knowledge it produces is neither "real" nor "fancied." Instead,
advertising shimmers somewhere between all such categories, which is
why it cannot, in some final, ultimate sense, be labeled either pro- or anti-
competitive.
Consider, for example, the emergence of Montgomery Ward and
Sears, Roebuck, both pioneers in creating the American consumerist cul-
ture. To some extent, Wards and Sears represented a competitive anti-
dote to the local monopolies of the rural or small-town general stores.
Those stores had become notorious for high prices, shoddy or misrepre-
sented goods, and oppressive credit policies. 137 On the other hand, local
merchants had often been community leaders, forming associations to
help promote, ironically, the very progress and economic growth which
made mail order distribution possible, e.g., settlement, road building,
train depots, post offices. They also had attacked the more sleazy retail-
ing practices of peddlers, for the sake of promoting the respectability of
Main Street merchandising. 138 Thus, while the Ward's catalogue
charged that "the farmers of today are tyrannized over by the country
merchants to a far worse extent than they realize,"' 139 the local
merchants' campaign against mail order sale (precursor to the perhaps
competition breaks down." Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The
Reatemon Case 127 U. PA. L. REv. 994, 1041 n.203 (1979); see also Schmalensee, supra note 47, at
321 & n.34. Schmalensee is currently a member of the President's Council of Economic Advisors.
137. See S. EWEN & E. EWEN, CHANNELS OF DESIRE: MASS IMAGES AND THE SHAPING OF
AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS 63 (1982).
138. S. STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS
MARKET 221 (1989).
139. i at 216.
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misplaced populism of cases like Brown Shoe 140 and Von's Grocery141)
charged that goods "not bought at home, of men who befriended you, of
men to whom you owe a living, are 'tainted' because they come
unfairly."
142
Wards and Sears represented vertical integration of a dramatic kind,
uniting manufacturers, jobbers, wholesale and retail in a single firm. The
scheme worked only because it could operate on a mass scale, with a
predictable consumer demand: Both Sears and Wards adapted "flow
principles" to distribution, which required buyers who could be counted
on to absorb the "flow" of goods. 143 The mass distribution of catalogues
was an ingenious method for achieving this flow. Using an advertising
technique later refined in radio ads, 144 both catalogues effectively dis-
placed the buyer's desire for personal contact, a desire which was pro-
jected onto the impersonal firm through the imagery of friendliness.
Sears, for example, called his catalogue the "Farmer's Friend"'145 and
introduced each one with a personal letter. Similarly, Ward wrote the
catalogue copy himself, using a folksy vernacular, and claimed to be a
"personal friend" to his millions of customers. 146
Ward's catalogue came to be called the "Great Wish Book,"' 147 for it
opened up a world of goods hitherto unavailable in rural areas. At one
level those goods were liberating. Women confined to farms, for exam-
ple, found in the catalogues not only devices to ease the drudgery of their
work, but also the mass-produced fashions that were becoming a symbol
of female independence. Fashion had once been available only to the
wealthy; ready-made garments democratized it.148 And risqu6 decora-
140. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The Court specifically referred to
the congressional goal of retaining "local control" over industry and promoting small business. Id.
at 316.
141. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Justice Stewart, in dissent, de-
scribes the majority opinion as "hardly more than a requiem for the so-called 'Mom and Pops'
grocery stores.., that are now economically and technologically obsolete in many parts of the'
country." Id. at 288.
142. S. STRASSER, supra note 138, at 216 (quoting William Allen White, editor of the Emporia,
Kansas Gazette).
143. Id. at 77.
144. R. MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE AMERICAN DREAM: MAKING WAY FOR MODER-
NrrY, 1920-1940, at 357 (1985).
145. S. EWEN & E. EWEN, supra note 137, at 65.
146. Id. at 64.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 178. Democratization of goods became a dominant theme in American advertising,
as in the repeated use of phrases like "Everyone (or anyone, or every home) can have one." (Or
"Now you too .. ). Marchand calls this theme the "Parable of the Democracy of Goods." As he
comments,
Incessantly and enticingly repeated, advertising visions of fellowship in a Democracy of
Goods encouraged Americans to look to similarities in consumption styles rather than to
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tions, like cosmetics, which upper-class women had borrowed from cour-
tesans to proclaim their independence from Victorian moral constraints,
were now available through catalogues to women on isolated farms and
to working girls trying to break away from the authority of immigrant
parents.14
9
At another level, however, catalogues represented control as well as
liberation. The goods offered for sale in the Wish Books, filled with en-
ticing pictures and descriptions, became vehicles through which freedom
was expressed and longing satisfied. The catalogues opened up possibili-
ties never before imagined and simultaneously portrayed a bountiful sup-
ply of commodities as essential to the fulfillment of that unleashed desire.
Self-identity became linked inexorably to the consumption of mass-pro-
duced goods, which in turn became the standard of what it meant to be
an American. In 1946, in fact, the Grolier Club Book Society listed
Ward's catalogue as one of the most influential books in American life, a
catechism of "the standard of American middle-class living."
150
The period between 1920 and 1940 marked the full emergence of
advertising as a crucial part of mass marketing. During this period ad-
vertising took on its distinctly modem character and established itself as
part of our culture. 151 This was American advertising's formative pe-
riod, and, therefore, probably its most culturally significant. From the
modem perspective ads from the 1920s and 1930s seem whimsically dis-
tant, yet at the same time peculiarly familiar, for the techniques which
emerged then are with us still, although often in more sophisticated
form.
This was also a time when advertising's contradictory goals of con-
trol and responsiveness stood out in stark relief. The articulated concern
of merchants at the time was to ensure a predictable consumer demand,
offsetting the potential for overproduction. With no small amount of
self-importance advertisers described themselves as spokespersons for
political power or control of wealth for evidence of significant equality.... Freedom of
choice came to be perceived as a freedom more significantly exercised in the market place
than in the political arena. This process... gained maturity in the 1950s as a sense of class
differences was nearly eclipsed by a fascination with the equalities suggested by shared
consumption patterns and "freely chosen" consumer "lifestyles."
R. MARCHAND, supra note 144, at 222.
149. Thus by 1905 Sears sold rouge throughout the country, labeling it "Rouge de Theatre" to
emphasize its slightly sinful allure. S. EWEN & E. EWEN, supra note 137, at 179-80.
150. Id. at 65 (quoting R. HENDRICKSON, THE GRAND EMPORIUMs 223 (1979)). For an em-
phasis on the extent to which new "consumption communities" replaced older traditional communi-
ties, see D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 109-16 (1973).
Catalogues played a key role in this process. See R. BERMAN, ADVERTISING AND SOCIAL CHANGE
76 (1981) (catalogues replaced the old salesman).
151. See R. MARCHAND, supra note 144, at 9-13. Marchand's book is a towering work of his-
torical scholarship, encyclopedic in coverage and brilliant in interpretation.
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modernity and guardians of unimpeded progress. An economy that was
understood in terms of economies of scale, rationalization, specialization,
and an integrated flow of materials seemed to require a high "velocity of.
flow" in the demand for goods. Advertisers proclaimed themselves ready
to ensure and rationalize that velocity: By rendering consumer demand
dependable and predictable, advertisers promised to remove the "waste
and lost motion in the channels of trade."' 5 2 They claimed that the ma-
turing of the American industrial structure apparently had left consum-
ers as the least rationalized part of the economy, and the most potentially
disruptive. In response to that problem, advertisers promised to "en-
hance the rationality and dynamism of the modem business system" by
educating consumers to a "predictable and enthusiastic demand for new
products."' 1
53
It is easy to overinterpret the emphasis on controlling consumer de-
mand.'5 4 This was a period when the imagery of progress, rationaliza-
tion, and efficiency (in flow chart terms) also dominated most other
fields.' 55 It is probably impossible, now, to separate the perceived re-
quirement for a dependably consumerist public from actual marketing
need. Any distinction between them tends to unravel. Also, despite the
rhetoric of grand social control that was invoked to justify the advertis-
ing profession and sell it to industrialists, individual advertising cam-
paigns were geared only toward selling particular products-broader
effects on the culture were necessarily incidental. And most significantly,
while the stated goal of advertisers was discipline, it was a discipline that
could only be achieved by studied attention to the actual desires, anxie-
ties, values, and goals of the consuming public. In that sense advertising
could "control" only by being obsessively, responsively "democratic."
In the effort to appeal to consumers, advertisers sought out areas of
experience otherwise ignored by the rationalism of the dominant culture.
For example, they emphasized touch, smell, and taste, drawing on mod-
em psychology for the notion that these sensations were culturally re-
pressed but could be unleashed-and then, of course, channeled into an
152. Id. at 2.
153. Id
154. Stuart Ewen probably makes this mistake in S. EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
(1976). See M. SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT ON
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1984). As Schudson says,
But advertising agents were not only men of confidence; they were confidence men. Their
livelihood depended on selling to business the idea that advertising was an effective market-
ing tool. It would be naive to read their sales pitches to the business community as honest
accounts of the power of advertising.
Id. at 175. Yet, Ewen is nevertheless an excellent cultural critic.
155. See, e.g., M. ADAS, MACHINES AS THE MEASURE OF MEN 410 (1989).
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association with commodities.15 6 For advertisers, who saw themselves as
members of the educated, rational elite, this incessant preoccupation
with the irrationality of the public was disquieting, certainly at odds with
the older, republican ideal of democracy as rooted in rational public dis-
course. As Marchand has written:
If we believe that the voice of the people is the voice of God... we
address them very differently than if we believe them to be fools, chil-
dren or beasts. But copywriters of the 1920s and 1930s could not se-
lect their content and choose their tone ...with such an exact
distinction. The consumer voice seemed at once to be a foolish beast
and the voice of God.
From one standpoint, much of the advertising elite looked down
upon the throng of consumers with bemused contempt: these masses
were ignorant, tasteless, emotionally foolish, and essentially "femi-
nine."... Yet from another vantage point, still envisioned as located
symbolically "above" the consumer masses, they assessed with awe the
economic power of these millions. Just like a mob .... "Mrs. Con-
sumer in the mass has an ominous, ruthless power." From this per-
spective advertising agents might well wish to view themselves as
ambassadors from these consumer citizens... [who formed] the voice
of God whose commandments had to be followed if the economic sys-
tem were to prosper.1
57
Inevitably, of course, advertisers both responded to and shaped con-
sumer desire; they simultaneously reflected and reinforced ideologies of
gender role, personal responsibility, success, social value, and the Ameri-
can Dream. Advertisements proved all the more powerful because they
were received passively-often in a state of inattention.15 8 Ads subtly
established broad frames of reference, identified boundaries of discourse,
determined relevant criteria.
The Listerine campaign, perhaps the single greatest advertising cam-
paign in American history, provides an excellent illustration. For years
Listerine had been sold unimaginatively as a general antiseptic, but be-
tween 1922 and 1927 its sales rose from $100,000 to over $4 million
yearly because copywriters hit upon a wonderfully novel approach. 159
Lifting the word "halitosis" from the inner pages of medical dictionaries,
they warned of "The Hidden Wells of Poison"' 60 that lurk in the mouth,
156. Advertisers as early as the 1930s were adopting a strategy designed for promoting "the
exploitation of the 'sublimated sense."' R. SHELDON & E. ARENS, CONSUMER ENGINEERING 100
(1932), quoted in ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLrrIcS OF STYLE IN CONTEMPORARY CUL-
TuRE 49 (S. Ewen ed. 1988).
157. R. MARCHAND, supra note 144, at 84.
158. See M. MILLER, BOXED IN: THE CULTURE OF T.V. 11 (1988) ("[A]dvertising must thus
pervade the atmosphere; for it wants, paradoxically, to startle its beholders without really being
noticed by them.").
159. R. MARCHAND, supra note 144, at 20.
160. S. EWEN, supra note 154, at 38.
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endangering one's dreams of happiness and success. Ads took the form
of little sociodramas of despair, drawing the reader in to identify with the
plight of unwary victims of halitosis: The hero or heroine would possess
all the variables necessary for success except sweet breath. Thus one ad
pictured a beautiful young woman gazing into a mirror, and asked fore-
bodingly, "What secret is your mirror holding back?" The woman pic-
tured in the ad was described as having talent, beauty, education, better
clothes than most "in her set," culture, and "the poise that travel
brings." Nevertheless, "in the one pursuit that stands foremost in the
mind of every girl and woman-marriage-she was a failure." Fortu-
nately, readers were assured, the solution was easy, for "the systematic
use of Listerine puts you on the safe and polite side." 161 Another ad
pictured a man troubled because he "was conscious that something stood
between him and greater business success.... Some subtle something he
couldn't lay his hands on.... Finally, one day, it dawned on him... the
truth that his friends had been too delicate to mention."' 62
Listerine ads obviously reinforced gender roles. They also conveyed
a stem, universalized message of personal responsibility for consumerist
failure ("Suspect yourself first" Listerine commanded), 163 while at the
same time offering up their product as the solution to deeply-felt anxie-
ties about personal inadequacy. The ads were so successful, and have
been continued and copied to such an extent, that 63% of the American
adult population now uses antiseptic mouthwash-a personal habit that
was virtually created by the Listerine ads. That particular brand has
been used at one time or another by 90% of mouthwash users, and in any
given month it is currently used by 23% of all American adults, a statis-
tic that translates to 40 million people. 164
Women were the target of ads more often than were men. Gender
roles became absolutely central to the culture of advertising, in large part
because advertisers dealt with ambivalence about their own social role by
feminizing the consumer-irrationality and preoccupation with smells
and textures could be associated more comfortably with women than
with men. As Printers Ink-a trade publication during the 1920s and
30s for the advertising industry-stated, "The proper study of mankind
161. R. MARCHAND, supra note 144, at 18-19.
162. S. EwEN, supra note 154, at 46.
163. Id at 102.
164. J. JONES, DoEs IT PAY To ADVERTISE? 69, 75-76 (1989). In the 1970s Listerine was
challenged by the FTC on its claim that Listerine reduced the incidence of colds and sore throats.
Warner-Lambert was forced to withdraw its claims and also insert a mea culpa disclaimer in all of
its ads between September 1978 and February 1980. This led to a marked decline in consumer




is man... but the proper study of markets is woman." 165 And "Wo-
man," it was assumed, lived not by logic but rather by "raw and crude
emotions."1
66
Women emerged from the ads designed for them in a complex role.
They were even more subject to public scrutiny and the First Impression
than were men ("You will be amazed to find how many times in one day
people glance at your nails. At each glance a judgment is made
... "1).167 They were also assumed to crave romance and glamour as the
only escape from their "monotonous and humdrum lives." Therefore,
ads, according to Printers Ink, should provide images of romance so that
housewives and women workers could "daily see themselves as femme
fatales, as Cleopatra or Helen of Troy."' 168
At the same time, women were portrayed not just as sex objects, but
also as consumers charged with new female responsibilities. The old defi-
nition of women as autonomous within the family sphere169 took on
modem dimension as that autonomy came to be defined as the authority
to direct consumer choices for the family-as a sort of quartermaster of
the household. Traditional homecraft was transformed into consumer
management, and women were charged with the task of planning so that
family "resources are utilized to buy the best possible combination of
satisfactions for today, and the best sequence of satisfactions for the
future."1 7
0
There was a good deal of independence suggested by that role, but
deference as well, deference both to family needs and to industry author-
ity. An early Wonder Bread ad told the story of a marriage imperiled by
low-quality bread ("People Whispered. Husband always ate in town.
Tasteless 'bargain bread' was to blame."). 171 Consistently, women were
told of the dire consequences that followed consumerist failure. Lysol,
for example, divided the house into separate arenas of minutely described
danger: Mothers were warned that even "the doorknobs threaten [chil-
dren] ... with disease."' 172 One especially grim tale opened with the
165. R. Marchand, supra note 144, at 66.
166. Id at 69.
167. S. EwEN, supra note 154, at 38.
168. R. MARCHAND, supra note 144, at 67.
169. See, eg., L. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN
REVOLUTION AMERICA (1980) (women in pre-Revolutionary America lived in a woman's domain;
women formed a tradition-bound, underdeveloped nation within a larger, more politically sophisti-
cated one).
170. S. EWEN, supra note 154, at 168 (quoting Benjamin Andrews, The Home Woman as Buyer
and Controller of Consumption, ANNALS, May 1929, at 41, 42); see also R. MARCHAND, supra note
144, at 167-71.
171. R. MARCHAND, supra note 144, at 113.
172. S. EwEN, supra note 154, at 170.
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banner headline, "Wife Takes Full Blame: Entire Family Had Dull-
White Teeth-All Using Soggy Toothbrushes That Failed to Clean."
Her two sons had paid the "full penalty" of dull-white, unattractive
teeth, until fortunately her husband discovered the importance of a good
toothbrush (Dr. West's).
173
Resonating with surprisingly modem themes, ads of this period
spelled out the contradictions of the modem woman's life: Women were
described as liberated and progressive yet, at the same time, attentive to
husband, home, and family. One of the most successful ad campaigns
informed women of Kotex, a product of real convenience that gained
quick and widespread use partly as a result of effective advertising, de-
spite the delicacy of the subject. Kotex ads depicted the modem, busy
woman as a role model, a woman who "lives every day of her life."'174
(As the tempo increased, by 1923 this theme became, "you need never
lose a single precious hour," and by 1925, "you never lose a single mo-
ment's precious charm"). 75 At the same time, women were still as-
sumed to be dependent on industry advice: Kotex ads provided them
with a personalized yet scientific and professional figure, Nurse Buck-
land, to whom they could refer for advice.
176
Ads encouraged women to liberate themselves from housework by
using modem goods and services, but largely for the sake of husbands
and children. In a laundry service ad, women were asked the troubling
question: "Just what is it to be a Good Wife in this Modem Age?" They
were then told, in effect, that liberation was itself a wifely duty:
Deep down in your heart-in the heart of every woman-is that eager,
wistful wish to be a good wife-a partner in your husband's plans; his
cheery companion in leisure hours.
You realize that in this advanced age your husband needs a mate
as modem-minded as himself; a wife whose tastes and temperament
are attuned to the present-day pace. He is moving forever forward.
You cannot afford to lag behind.177
Lest new liberation lead them to forget their primary responsibility,
women were still reminded that "Men are judged by what they accom-
173. R. MARCHAND, supra note 144, at 303. Other ads resorted to real scare tactics. A soap
company asked readers to learn the lesson provided by a dancer who had collapsed and died on stage
from "clogged pores." Even more terrifying was a campaign launched by the Scott Paper Company:
"Now doctors ask you: Is your bathroom paper safe?" One ad pictured masked doctors and nurses
looking down on a patient, hidden from view, while the copy ominously informs us, "and the trouble
began with harsh toilet tissue," for, as we are told, "A single contact with inferior toilet tissue may
start the way for serious infection-and a long, painful illness." Id. at 102-03.
174. Id. at 22.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 21-22.
177. Id. at 174.
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plish-women by the homes they keep."' 178 In an ad entitled, "When
lovely women vote," Listerine daringly introduced the theme of women's
suffrage, but only by asking "thousands of women of this type--charm-
ing, educated, well-to-do, prominent in the social and civic life of her city
.. : What tooth paste do you use?"' 179 The consistent message was that
liberation did nothing to relieve women of the responsibility to consume
wisely, for the sake of pleasing others: As Camay reminded women,
"For life is a Beauty Contest for every woman" and "The Eyes of Men
... the Eyes of Women Judge your Loveliness every day."' 8 0
Roles were no less rigidly restricted for other ad actors. Men por-
trayed as consumer/husbands were virtually always businessmen in suits,
never blue-collar workers. Professionals like doctors and scientists ap-
peared as authority figures to whom women should be attentive, but not
as real model consumers, and minorities appeared only in servile sup-
porting roles.' 8 ' The obvious message was that male success meant being
a white, middle class businessman, and ads stressed the startling ease
with which men could blunder in their climb up the ladder of business
success by failures in product choices related to bathing, dressing, shav-
ing, or oral hygiene. During the Depression, ads (especially by insurance
companies) urged fathers to provide for their sons' future. One poignant
Depression-era ad for Ethyl gasoline pictured a father who was an appar-
ent failure, with his son sitting next to him in the car; the son is leaning
forward, one fist clenched and he is saying, "Gee, Pop-They're All
Passing You."'8 2
The grand promise of advertising, however, was that even in the face
of the greatest of challenges, solutions were available to all, democrati-
cally. It was the old promise of Sears and Wards, and it remained a
pervasive theme even throughout the Depression. Concentrated wealth
at the top of a social hierarchy in no way prevented everyone from en-
joying the benefits of any single featured product. Mothers were told
that no wealth provided her child with better nourishment than Cream of
Wheat; Chase and Sanborn insisted that no "king, prince, statesman or
capitalist" could enjoy better coffee; Ivory Soap assured "nice hands"
even for those who could not afford maids. Indeed, Absorbine Jr. took
some care to document the rapid advance of athlete's foot among the
178. Id. at 188.
179. Id. at 187.
180. Id. at 178.
181. E.g., "Yes, suh, Boss, I keeps 'em moving with Drano." Id. at 193.
182. Id. at 327.
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upper classes, thereby assuring more modestly situated readers that cures
for such afflictions were available equally to all.1
8 3
The democratization of goods heralded by the ads of the 1920s and
1930s became a kind of consumerist frenzy during the post-war period of
the 1950s. Then, the inevitable tension between rigid, vaguely moralistic
role definition and democratization began to show itself. Gender roles as
portrayed on TV remained firmly in place, with women still playing the
role of household consumers, but emphasis on style and color was more
common, even in durable goods, and women were frequently portrayed
as childish, impulsive spenders. Men, in contrast, played the heartier
role of producer and rational saver. As a result, those two dimensions of
a capitalist economy, consumption and productive investment, were rec-
onciled through gender-differentiated role playing. As a McCalls' ad
stated, "categorically, ... man is always the producer.., woman, the
consumer."
18 4
Nevertheless, by the 1950s style completely had taken over even the
automobile, thereby "feminizing" (despite the masculine imagery em-
ployed) one of the few products traditionally reserved for male consumer
choice. Henry Ford, who disliked advertising, had tried to retain func-
tionalism as his goal. Ford offered simple, sensible cars ("In any color so
long as it's black") and could not sell them.18 5 General Motors, in con-
trast, had led the way with frequent and advertised style changes, eventu-
ally providing what was in effect an "assembly-line 'custom' car, an
oxymoron on wheels,"'1 6 and Ford was forced to follow suit: The pro-
ductive efficiencies Ford achieved through uniformity were not enough to
offset the loss in sales to those who wanted style.
187
By the 1950s, when General Motors was clearly market leader
among the Big Three, in theory buyers could choose any combination of
style options that suited them, creating their own individualized car as
the ultimate form of male (later female) self-identification. Automobiles
were designed and advertised to suggest sexual fantasy, power, and wish-
183. Id. at 217-19.
184. Id. at 162. It has been noted that the Reagans provided a symbolic representation of that
division. She was the lavish spender, while he always presented himself as a person of plain taste,
oblivious to style. S. EwEN, supra note 154, at 149. Notably, this same dichotomy has been played
out at the extreme edges of American Protestantism, with Jerry Falwell's fundamentalism represent-
ing the "masculine" value of self-discipline, while the Bakkers represented "feminine" impulsiveness
in spending. See Fitzgerald, Reflection" Jim and Tammy, NEW YORKER, Apr. 23, 1990, at 45.
185. R. MARcHAND, supra note 144, at 156-57.
186. D. POPE, supra note 1, at 261.
187. J. BAIN, supra note 91, at 298.
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fulfillment, with'styles that were more suggestive of rockets than
automobiles-swept-wing appearance, cockpits, and tailfins.18S
All of these possibilities for style variation, however, still were of-
fered within a carefully structured set of "price classes"-from "low" to
"low-middle" to "high-middle" to "high"-representing, respectively,
54%, 28%, 13%, and 5% of the new car market in 1951. (Many people,
of course, bought used cars.) Price classes corresponded closely to
power, length, and weight, with the higher price classes representing
more of all three. 18 9 Thus, consumers could in a sense design their own
cars, but always within a hierarchy in which the most exciting options
were in fact unavailable to most people. Despite advertising imagery that
held out style and power as available to all and despite consumer rejec-
tion of the inexpensive, straightforward Ford in favor of extravagant
style, it is unclear how many consumers actually bought all the options
they wanted.
Here is a case in which the liberal's model of the pre-existing func-
tional product, without the "wasteful" imagery of style and advertising,
actually existed in the form of the old Ford approach to design and mar-
keting. Consumer response rejected it. Yet, ironically, the "waste" of
highly advertised style changes during the 1950s, while more "democrat-
ically" responsive to American cultural preference, proved to be a factor
in creating conditions of failure for the American automobile industry.
Volkswagens, for example, with their simple and functional style, became
one of the great marketing successes of the 1960s,190 setting the stage for
the triumph of the Japanese manufacturers in the 1980s.
Japanese competition now arouses American resentment. Its suc-
cess, however, is a testament to the stagnation and complacency that had
characterized the American automobile industry, an industry that de-
pended upon imagery more than price or quality competition. Could it
not be said that this oligopolistic overreliance on imagery, with little or
no entrepreneurial deviation from industry norms, amounted in eco-
nomic terms to a market failure? Indeed, Japanese competition is now
producing the salutary effects a free, competitive market provides. In
188. S. EwEN, supra note 154, at 210.
189. . BAN, supra note 91, at 297. For product differentiation in the automobile industry, see
also F. SCHERER, supra note 90, at 258, 398-401.
190. See L. DOBROW, WHEN ADVERTISING TRIED HARDER: THE SIXTIEs: THE GOLDEN
AGE OF AMERICAN ADVERTISING 9 (1984). Experts have considered the Volkswagen campaign
one of the best in the history of advertising. "Gone were the lush settings, the artfully elongated
automobiles, the beautiful models. In their place stood the 'Beetle,' unadorned and unretouched,
and almost always in black and white.... Simplicity was proving to be a virtue .... " For a
measured but critical analysis of style changes in the automobile industry during the 1950s period,
see F. SCHERER, supra note 90, at 398-401.
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1980, Japanese-made cars had an average of two defects, whereas GM
averaged 5.4, Chrysler 8.1, and Ford 6.7. Today the figures are 1.7, 1.8,
and 1.5 respectively for the Big Three, and the Japanese figure is 1.2.
With respect to price, in 1980 the average American car cost $2000 more
than its Japanese counterpart. Now the gap is between $500 and $600.191
No single commodity captures the paradoxical extremes of control
and liberation through image so fully as the story of blue jeans.192 In the
19th century denims were among the earliest mass-produced garments,
built for laborers in California who were removed from the customary
household production of clothes. In 1850 it would have been unimagin-
able for anyone in the upper classes to wear "dungarees." In movies,
however, jeans began to take on a new meaning, albeit one still related to
the garments' actual origins. Cowboys became heroes, representing a
nobler, simpler, mythological American past of rugged uncorrupted indi-
vidualism; and this imagery became associated with the jeans they often
wore. Meanwhile, jeans started to appear as a symbol of rebellion-for
example, in Rebel Without a Cause 193 or The Wild One. 194 They were
then adopted as a symbol of contempt for post-war suburban society.
For adolescent girls, jeans represented rejection of crinolines and high-
heels; for boys, they meant rejection of a future of the notorious gray
flannel suit and all it symbolized.
By the mid-1960s, of course, blue jeans were also part of the cos-
tume of commitment to social justice-part of the civil rights movement
and the antiwar movement: "The garb of toil was sanctified by the dig-
nity of struggle," in the minds of student activists. 195 Finally, it seemed,
fashion was democratized, not by filtering from the top "down" (as by
the Sears and Wards catalogues) but rather by being lifted, so to speak,
from the bottom up. For women of the 1960s, jeans were especially liber-
ating; wearing them meant rejecting restrictive fashion, sexual objectifi-
cation, and passivity: "This was the cloth of action, a challenge to the
social fabric of sexuality. The cloth of labor became the emblem of
liberation.'
96
Ironically, however, by the 1980s jeans were part of the mainstay of
fashion, having made their way from practical worker's clothing to sym-
bol of revolt, and finally to status symbol. By 1980 jeans represented a $5
191. Miller & Washington, Japanese Ca Born in the USA, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 9, 1990,
at 36, 37.
192. This is described in S. EwEN & E. EWEN, supra note 137, at 109-16.
193. Rebel Without a Cause (Warner Bros. 1955).
194. The Wild One (The Stanley Kramer Co. 1953).
195. S. EWEN & E. Ewm, supra note 137, at 113.
196. Id at 114.
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billion industry, and in ads everywhere they were displayed in modem,
designer form, infused with a "surrealistic, new-wave flavor." 197 As the
advertising director of Bon Jour Jean explained, "We try to make adver-
tising artistic." 198 Another marketing director commented: "Jeans are
sold purely on image. The make of jeans is a cult."1 99
As one example of that image-making, a poster ad running the
whole length of a bus shows an assembly line of backsides unmistakably
female, given their rakish posture, even though the figures are visible
only from waist to mid-thigh; all are pressed into their variously colored
designer jeans. The motto reads, "The Ends Justify the Jeans. .... -200
Brooke Shields, it turns out, was only fifteen when she made the striking
Calvin Klein jeans ad: Legs apart, she asked, "You want to know what
comes between me and my Calvins? Nothing. '20 1 In 1987 a commercial
showed a young girl tearful at her boyfriend's departure. She opens a
parcel he has left for her, and dressed in T-shirt and underpants, she
ecstatically lies on the bed to pull on the jeans he has left behind. The
girl who played the role was fourteen.
20 2
While peculiarly American in origin, jeans are now an international
symbol. For example, a Soviet student writes that the key to social popu-
larity in Russia lies in wearing jeans. Of course their production is also
international.20 3 As capital moves abroad to take advantage of non-
union labor, weavers and dyers and cutters and sewers and finishers work
in foreign factories to produce that most "egalitarian" and "American"
of products.2° 4 As always, advertising obscures the reality of manufac-
ture-the images with which advertisers surround a product are never
the images of their production. As the Ewens comment:
The contradiction between promise and production resides in the im-
age itself ... In blue jeans, the most functional and least ritualistic of
clothes, fashion reveals itself as a complex world of history, promise
and change; as a capturing of continual "truths".... Resistance and
conformity coexist within "the mirror of fashion. 2 05
197. Id
198. Id (quoting Thomas, The Jeans of Summer BACKSTAGE, July 18, 1980, at 1).
199. E. CLARK, THE WANT MAKERS 112 (1988) (quoting Derek Mottershead, marketing direc-
tor of Lee Cooper jeans company).
200. S. EwEN & E. EwEN, supra note 137, at 109.
201. E. CLARK, supra note 199, at 115.
202. Id at 115-16.
203. S. EwEN & E. EwEN, supra note 137, at 115.
204. Id at 114.
205. Id at 114-15. For the continuing simultaneous appeal to elegance and social equality in




In the American experience, advertising has served, self-consciously
at times, to bridge or mediate the relationship between tradition and mo-
dernity. The advertising of the 1920s, which saw its cultural realization
in the 1950s, served in its aggregate efforts to sell the abundance, conven-
ience and variety made possible by modem production, thereby creating
a culture of consumption. Yet those same ads, through their rigid depic-
tion of social roles, sought to preserve a terrain of reassuring tradition
even for modernist consumers. The relationship between modernism and
tradition was unstable, as was the underlying relation between the sup-
posed rationalization of production and a marketing strategy geared to
the concededly irrational. The result is a contemporary world of adver-
tising, first unleashed in the 1960s, which is as thoroughgoing an instance
of post-modernism as exists in our culture today. Along with the libera-
tion implicit in the demolition of roles lies a chaotic and incessant preoc-
cupation with immediate gratification, rampant eroticism, and a
"democratization" of culture that in its utter fragmentation may belie the
notion of culture altogether.20 6
This ever-increasing blare of images has become the principal form
of inter-firm competition in the sale of consumer products.20 7 If antitrust
law is to play a responsible role in response to this competition, it'must,
in the best of the realist tradition, develop a vocabulary for making diffi-
cult normative judgments about the scope and mode of its deployment in
particular market settings.
206. This is not to say that consumer tastes or perceptual experiences are universal or invariant,
i.e., exogenous. For example, Japanese ads often appear mysterious to Americans; the Japanese
want ads to be "beautiful," a quality they apparently find lacking in American commercials. In one
Japanese ad a toy fireman painstakingly climbs a ladder to the top of a skyscraper where he extin-
guishes a cigarette. The ad is for batteries. Another ad, for whiskey, shows a puppy's small adven-
tures as it wanders about the city in the rain. A voice says, "There are all kinds of ways of living.
Take care. Anyhow, take care. Everyone take care." E. CLARK, supra note 199, at 48. (Notably,
Tokyo is the home of the world's most powerful advertising agency, Dentsu, but the United States
still absorbs almost half the world's advertising expenditure, and spends the greatest percentage of
GNP on it, 2.4%. I. at 45.)
Conversely, Western ads have sometimes been a disaster in Japan. One shampoo ad showed a
man's hand caressing a woman's hair. A sample of thirty Japanese men and women were asked to
imagine what happened next, and all but one said that the man produced a sword and severed the
woman's head. The ad was promptly withdrawn. In Taiwan, Pepsi's "Come Alive with the Pepsi
Generation" suggested to alarmed Taiwanese that Pepsi would cause their ancestors to rise from the
dead. Id. at 43-44. Nevertheless, globalization of markets is clearly the direction of the future, given
the power of cable and satellite TV. What is the nature of the "universal reality" global ads will
draw upon and convey? Will those ads be "efficient"?
207. For a wealth of data, see the special issue of ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 28, 1988, describing
in detail the 100 top U.S. advertising spenders (Philip Morris became number one in 1988, displacing




If economics is helpful in this regard, it must climb down from its
perch of ahistoric universality208 to confront the messy particularity of
real markets. As we have suggested, it is no answer, in the case of adver-
tising, to say simply that antitrust must promote efficiency-nor is it an
answer just to proclaim, as do some wistful liberals, that, "We believe in
the competitive ethic."1
2 °9
One source of inspiration for a serious realist approach to advertis-
ing might be the approach taken in the recent Aspen Skiing Company
210
case, one bright spot in the otherwise bleak landscape of the law-and-
economics neo-formalism of modem Supreme Court antitrust jurispru-
dence. Justice Stevens, who seems uniquely skilled in antitrust analysis,
wrote a careful, contextual opinion in a case that could have been an-
swered the opposite way by simply invoking an abstract principle-the
principle that no firm, even a monopolist, has a legal duty to help its
competitors. As Stevens conceded, "even a firm with monopoly power
has no general duty to engage in a joint marketing program with a com-
petitor.1211 On the other hand, in the best tradition of Cardozian realist
jurisprudence,212 Justice Stevens seized upon a single, limited exception
to that principle-Lorain Journal-to argue that the "high value that we
have placed on that right to refuse to deal with other firms does not mean
that the right is unqualified.
'213
Justice Stevens then carefully told the story of the owners of down-
hill Aspen skiing facilities who were parties to the case.214 He focused on
the experience of both competitors and consumers, and on the specific
208. See C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 33-54 (1973). Geertz' relentless
demolition of presumptuous cultural universals serves as an apt rejoinder to the grandiose claim of
all too many economists. See also R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCI-
ENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAX 90-108 (1983).
209. See Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From?
Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 963-64 (1987).
210. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). In 1974, Robert
Pitofsky urged a careful contextual approach to the regulation of advertising, including considera-
tion of its relation to competition and antitrust issues generally. Unfortunately, he was ignored. See
Pitofsky, supra note 47.
211. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 600.
212. See, e.g., McPherson v. Buick Motors Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see also E.
LEvi, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).
213. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 601 (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U,S. 143
(1951)). A publisher of a newspaper, once the only news and advertising disseminating business in
town, tried to destroy a small radio station which had dared to start operating in a nearby commu-
nity. The publisher's refusal to sell advertising to persons who patronized the radio station was
treated by the Court as an antitrust violation.
214. Originally three companies had offered an interchangeable all-Aspen skiing ticket, making
a variety of mountains available to consumers on Aspen skiing vacations. The largest company
bought the second largest, becoming the dominant firm in the area, and eventually excluded the
third from the interchangeable ticket agreement.
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details of the local market in ski-lift tickets. Ultimately, he was able to
characterize the decision to opt out of the pre-existing cooperative ar-
rangement as a "decision by a monopolist to make an important change
in the character of the market. 215 Then, having reached that threshold
characterization decision-that the monopolist had altered the market
structure in ski-lift tickets-Justice Stevens narrowed the issue to
whether or not that change was exclusionary in the sense that it "tends to
impair the opportunities of rivals" and "does not further competition on
the merits. 216 He thus faced the precise question: Whether, in the par-
ticular context, the behavior in question was anti-competitive or pro-
competitive in a normative sense. In order to answer that question, he
then cited detailed anecdotal and expert evidence about actual consumer
preference and convenience.
The Aspen Ski case is suggestive, not for its results, but for the care-
ful contextual approach it employed. As applied to advertising, a contex-
tual approach would at least mean not automatically counting
advertising gains as a positive efficiency, and therefore a defense to
charges of anti-competitive behavior. We should instead be entitled to
ask, as did Justice Stevens, whether particular advertising campaigns
promote competition "on the merits"-just as we should be able to ask
whether they "impair the opportunities of rivals"-without quibbling
over abstract definitions of entry barrier.
The refusal to treat advertising as automatically within a single cate-
gory of fungible business expenses might carry with it broad policy impli-
cations. We could start, for example, by reevaluating the tax
deductibility of advertising expenses. Such a reevaluation could take into
account the social desirability of particular products: Senator Bill Brad-
ley has already proposed denying tax deductions for cigarette advertising
($2.5 billion annually), given the health risks of smoking.217 It might be
possible, in the same manner, to refashion tax deductions according to
some assessment of the true social desirability of image production itself.
Deductibility might be allowed up to a certain amount to encourage new
entrants, but disallowed beyond that point in order to cool the advertis-
ing frenzy that characterizes oligopolistic competition. Such tax changes
might be the single most effective method of redirecting non-price com-
petition toward improvements in quality, safety, and design innovation.
215. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 604.
216. Id. at 605 n.32 (quoting 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978)) (empha-
sis added).
217. S. 776, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). See also Will, As You're Reading This Three Smokers
Will Die, Buffalo News, Feb. 27, 1990, at B3, col. 1.
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As related more directly to conventional antitrust law, perhaps it is
time openly to confront the gap between the traditional model of price
competition and a real world characterized by competition in the pro-
duction of imagery. Stigler and others pretend that gap away by, in ef-
fect, positing advertising as the commodity consumers choose to
purchase. Unless one retreats into that tautological ploy, however, the
ubiquity of oligopoly, with its tendency to substitute advertising for price
competition, calls into question the very meaning of competition, and
therefore, the real goals of antitrust law.
Once confronted, the analytic implications of the gap between tradi-
tional models and oligopolistic reality might flip conventional antitrust
assumptions on their head. Implicit in antitrust doctrine, for example, is
the assumption that oligopoly is preferable to monopoly. Should that
assumption be reexamined in light of the fact that oligopolists, achieving
price stability, are under competitive pressure chiefly to do more adver-
tising? For example, when Maxwell House alone dominated the Eastern
United States market in coffee, its advertising budget was apparently suf-
ficiently limited that small firms could continue to offer their own, locally
popular brands of coffee. It was the competitive entry of another nation-
ally advertised brand, Folgers, which led advertising costs to skyrocket
and local companies to drop out of the market. The zeal of FTC liberals
to attack Maxwell House and protect Folgers in that context may have
been misguided. So too with the "potential competition" rational of
Clorox. If Procter and Gamble had, in fact, introduced a new brand of
bleach and advertised it heavily, consumers would have been subjected to
an advertising war between giants. Advertising battles are not necessar-
ily a good thing, especially in light of the tendency of such wars to drive
out local firms which could otherwise coexist with a monopolist under no
advertising pressure. On the other hand, the predatory deployment of
monopolist advertising advantages to drive out local, fledging firms, as in
ReaLemon, is at least as pernicious in effect as oligopolist advertising
wars. The point here is that "competition" might not be an unqualified
social goal if all it means is competition in expensive advertising and
higher costs of production: Judgments must be made about the nature
and effects of that competition "on the merits."
The current market in beer lies somewhere between Maxwell House
and ReaLemon, providing an illustration of the complexity of the norma-
tive judgments that might be made. In 1980, Anheuser-Busch controlled
28% of the market;218 by the end of 1989, it controlled 42%, and is ex-
pected by experts to control at least 50% by the mid-1990s. Its closest
218. Smith, America's Most Admired Corporations, FORTuNE, Jan. 29, 1990, at 58.
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competition comes from Miller (22%). Coors has 9% and may buy
Stroh's (10%) in the near future.219 Many once-familiar brands already
have dropped out of the market. In order to compete with Anheuser
other beer makers began to lower prices; in retaliation, Anheuser was
able to cut its own prices and anticipate an increase in market share,
given its own competitive edge based on successful advertising. "So price
as a tool for our competition is no longer there anymore," Mr. Busch was
quoted as explaining, "it is no longer effective." 220 In a market that does
not anticipate an overall increase in beer consumption, Anheuser strives
to increase sales through advertising designed to woo consumers from
other brands. The famous Clydesdales, the St. Louis Cardinals, and an
expanding group of family theme parks help maintain the corporate im-
age. In addition, Anheuser spends about $400 million a year in media
ads, more than Miller and Coors combined. Roughly two-thirds goes to
sports advertising; Anheuser is a sponsor, usually the exclusive beer
sponsor, for 23 of the 26 Major League Baseball teams and over 300
college sports teams.221
If it reaches its goal of 50%, Anheuser will still, of course, not be a
"monopolist." Does its position combined with advertising advantages
nevertheless present an antitrust problem? As with ReaLemon, it has the
clout to inhibit price competition by price cuts combined with deploy-
ment of a well established imagery advantage. At this point, however,
with most local breweries already driven out of the market, protecting
Miller, Stroh's, and Coors from domination might only protect their op-
tion to engage in competitive national advertising. Uncontested
Anheuser domination might be less socially destructive, especially given
the problem of teenage drinking, which is no doubt encouraged by
macho beer ad imagery during sporting events.
In terms of traditional antitrust criteria-pro-competitive vs. anti-
competitive, gain or loss in consumer welfare-the beer market simply
evades analysis. It does seem plausible, however, to suggest that the vast
sums spent on advertising amount to economic waste of resources that
cannot and will not be redirected toward more value-enhancing activities
through market forces alone. In this sense, then, one might conclude
that "competition" is not working in the beer industry-that the market
in a sense, has become stuck. More broadly, in a case like the Cereal
Case, in which three powerful firms engage in the endless proliferation of
brands, all marketed with frenetic advertising appeals, perhaps courts
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and the FTC should ask whether the practice requires affirmation as
competition (by definition), or whether it might be challenged as having
little to do with responsible capitalist production.222 Is there some rem-
edy, other than Japanese competition?
By way of example illustrating the converse, reflect on how antitrust
law might deal with a voluntary agreement by cereal manufacturers to
limit advertising expenses and refrain from introducing new brands ab-
sent new entry, with the possible effect of stabilizing market shares. An-
titrnst as abstraction would condemn the arrangement as tantamount to
cartel. To uphold the agreement, however, would be to make a particu-
lar judgment about advertising as competition, a judgment that might see
the agreement as an example of responsible capitalism rather than as
anti-competitive. Similarly, what of an agreement to engage in joint
product advertising rather than competitive brand advertising, at least
beyond a certain level? In fact, might such a plan be imposed, as ulti-
mately less anti-competitive than heavily advertised brand proliferation?
Antitrust law is premised on the assumption that we are not socially
ill-served by capitalism, but rather by capitalism run rampant. This as-
sumption means that hard contextual judgments necessarily are required,
and whatever its strength as a critique of liberal formalism, the neo-for-
malism of law-and-economics is ill suited to making these judgments.22 3
The liberals who challenged advertising during the 1960s and 1970s
made some mistakes: To the core, they were rationalists and positivists
who could not quite believe that image and desire could be more real,
even for economics, than the thing itself.224 (Conservatives in America
222. Even Patrick Buchanan, in a recent column about a different issue (take-overs), suggested
the normative category of "vulture capitalist." In a similar spirit, could not the FTC have legiti-
mately concluded that the cereal market in the 1960s, like its takeover counterpart in the 1980s, had
reached a level of unacceptable and wasteful frenzy? See Buchanan, Vulture Capitalists Have Left
The Nation's Economy At Its Knees, Buffalo News, Feb. 22, 1990, at C3, col. 1. Another conserva-
tive, George Will, recently wrote a scathing attack on our "flaccid" policy with respect to cigarette
advertising, citing especially the efforts to target the young and the least educated. Under pressure,
R.J. Reynolds recently withdrew plans to market an "Uptown" brand to blacks in inner cities, but it
also acknowledged plans to market a new "Dakota" brand to "virile" females, by which it largely
means uneducated. Senator Bill Bradley has proposed denying tax deductions ($2.5 billion annually)
for tobacco advertising. The companies spend $6.9 million a day on advertising and promotion,
which manipulatively "plays upon teenagers' desire for autonomy and anxiety about social accept-
ance and sexual allure." Will, supra note 217.
223. For a good, brief but critical summary of the inherent limitations of the currently fashiona-
ble "Chicago" school of economic thought, see R. BACKHOUSE, A HISTORY OF MODERN ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 393-96 (paperback ed. 1987).
224. In 1859, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., in contrast, understood that photography meant a
new release of image from time and space. "Form," he said "is henceforth divorced from matter."
See S. EWEN, supra note 154, at 24-25. Given modem physics, the image is in a sense more real,
since it is released from the particular constraints of how humans perceive the world-that is, in
fixed terms of matter, linear time, and physical space.
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have understood that fact, which is why they have been winning presi-
dential elections.) 225 Yet, the liberals are to be celebrated because they
did understand that antitrust law is about the willingness to make re-
sponsible choices, choices about markets and, therefore, also about
power and the shaping of our culture.2 6
It has become something of a cich to describe the 1980s as the
decade of spend-thrift greed, yet, the economic figures (even leaving aside
morality) are, in fact, sobering: environmental destruction, savings and
loan bailout costs, nuclear waste clean-up costs, a low savings rate,
mounting burdens of public and private debt, and dismal failure to invest
in the basic resources of a sound economy, like education, public health,
and the welfare of our children. 227 Advertising is not to blame for all of
those economic mistakes, but it does reflect and reinforce the culture that
produced them,2 8 and it has been complicit in effectively ruling them out
of the bounds of consumer choice. If antitrust law is really about assum-
ing responsibility for the shape of our economic life, advertising should
be on the agenda for reconsideration.
225. Of course the use of advertising in political campaigns raises hard questions about the rela-
tion between image and substance, control and consent. It has now become commonplace to point
out that politics in America has become a politics of media images, with voters reduced to consum-
ers choosing a packaged product. "The chasm between surface and reality widens." See S. EWEN,
supra note 154, at 267-71.
226. While Eastern Europe is learning from us about such notions as market pricing, we might
learn from some of them about the meaning of responsibility. Consider, for example, President
Vaclav Havel's recent speech before Congress. Rejecting the traditional Marxist position that being
precedes consciousness, he then said,
For this reason, the salvation of this human world lies nowhere else than in the human
heart, in the human power to reflect, in human meekness and in human responsibility....
We are still incapable of understanding that the only genuine backbone of all our actions, if
they are to be moral, is responsibility. Responsibility to something higher than my family,
my country, my company, my success--responsibility to the order of being where all our
actions are indelibly recorded and where and only where they will be properly judged.
TIME, Mar. 5, 1990, at 14, 15 (publishing the text of Havel's speech).
227. See, ag., REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE CON-
GRESS, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 28, 1989).
228. Ironically, as we celebrate the seeming world triumph of capitalism, we may be compelled
to confront the serious defects in our own culture-specific form of economic activity. See, eg., Fal-
lows, "Wake Up, Americal, N.Y. REv. oF BOOKS, Mar. 1, 1990, at 14.

